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The Right to Be Let Alone: The Kansas Right of
Privacy
J. Lyn Entrikin*
"The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become
public and which parts we shall hold close. "
"The state of the law [ofprivacy] is still that of a haystack in a hurricane.-2
I. INTRODUCTION

By nature, Kansans value their privacy and solitude. From the state's
humble beginnings in 1861, Kansas homesteaders were an independent lot,
fiercely defending the right to stake their claims on the lonely tallgrass
prairie. 3 Given the pioneering spirit of those who survived drought and harsh
winters to tame the wild prairie into farmland, it is no wonder that Kansas was
one of the earliest states to recognize the common law right of privacy:
a
4
constellation of rights collectively known as the right to be let alone.
Not long after Kansas achieved statehood, the transcontinental railroad
was completed in 1870, making coast-to-coast transportation affordable and
interstate commerce feasible. The explosion of science and technology that
characterized the late nineteenth century eventually led to the recognition and

evolution of state privacy rights. The hand camera became widely available
in the late 1880s, 5 providing opportunities for joumalists and others to capture
* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. J.D.
Washburn University School of Law, 1987; M.P.A. University of Kansas, 1982; B.G.S. University of
Kansas, 1977. The author thanks William H. Bowen School of Law for research support. Professors
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel and Jeffrey D. Jackson each offered helpful comments and suggestions on earlier
versions of this article, for which the author is grateful. The author also thanks Riley Graber for his
invaluable assistance in finalizing the manuscript for publication. Finally, the author acknowledges Max
Entrikin for inspiring a lifelong fascination with the right of privacy and for exemplifying the values
associated with its protection.
1. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231,235 (Minn. 1998).
2. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
3.

See, e.g., WES JACKSON, CONSULTING THE GENIUS OF THE PLACE: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO

A NEW AGRICULTURE 25-29 (2010) (discussing the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its aftermath). See
generally DAVID BOUCHARD, IF YOU'RE NOT FROM THE PRAIRIE... (1995); JOHN MADSON, WHERE THE
SKY BEGAN: LAND OF THE TALLGRASS PRAIRIE (1995); Homestead Act Sewed Its Way Into U.S. Fabric,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO WEEKEND EDITION (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/16/l6l228294/

homestead-act-sewed-its-way-into-u-s-fabric.
4. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. "[The four distinct kinds of privacy tort] are tied together
by a common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except each protects against interference
with the right to be let alone." Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995 (Kan. 1973).
5. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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private poses on film. The camera was soon followed by the invention of the
phonograph 6 and moving pictures, 7 and later radio 8 and finally television. 9
Media celebrities, virtually unknown at common law, took their place in
public life as a result of the technological developments of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 10 By the mid-twentieth century, state courts
and legislatures began to recognize the pecuniary interest in controlling the
commercial use of celebrities' professional personas.11
In the early years of the twentieth century, Kansas was among the states
that took the lead in recognizing a common law right of privacy. 12 Since
then, Kansas courts have generally followed the Restatement (Second) of
13
Torts in defining and recognizing actionable invasion of privacy claims.
With limited exceptions, 14 however, the Kansas Legislature has been slow to
recognize the right of privacy by statutory enactment. And both the Kansas
and federal courts have repeatedly recognized a variety of absolute and
qualified defenses to Kansas common law privacy claims. The result is a
well-established common law right of privacy, but with several traps for the
unwary. A look behind the curtain reveals that what in 1918 appeared to be a
remarkably progressive approach to the right of privacy has evolved over time
to a constrained set of privacy rights relative to those most other states
recognize.
The literature addressing the Kansas common law right of privacy is
notably sparse. In an effort to fill the gap, this Article synthesizes the law
recognizing invasion of privacy claims under Kansas common law and
Kansas statutes. 15 It does not address rights of privacy grounded in the U.S.
or Kansas Constitutions, nor does it attempt to explore specialized privacy
rights protected by federal enactments or regulations. Except to the extent
that violations of Kansas criminal statutes may give rise to actionable civil
claims for invasion of privacy, 16 this Article also does not address criminal
6. See Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631, 632 (Pa. 1937).
7. See Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918).
8. See Waring, 194 A. at 632 (addressing legal issues involving phonograph records and radio
broadcasts that "challenge the vaunted genius of the law to adapt itself to new social and industrial conditions
and to the progress of science and invention").
9. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 1956) (taking judicial
notice of more than seventeen million television sets in use in the United States in 1956).
10. See Waring, 194 A. at 632-33 (noting that Waring's orchestra initially performed in dance halls
and vaudeville stage, later in live radio broadcasts, and finally on phonograph records).
11. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Eltore,
229 F.2d at 491-92.
12. See Kunz, 172P. at 532-33.

13. See Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 228 (Kan. 2004) (quoting Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d
1, 6 (Kan. 1975)); see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 854 (D. Kan. 1977) (citing Froehlich v.
Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Kan. 1973)).
14. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2523(a) (2013) (imposing civil liability for violation of statutes
prohibiting strip searches and body cavity searches); cf id. § 21-4015a (Kansas Funeral Privacy Act of 2007)
(repealed by ch. 136, § 307 (2010)).
15. Although this Article focuses primarily on claims for money damages, the availability of equitable
relief is briefly discussed in Part V.B.
16. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2523.
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and constitutional law dealing with unlawful searches. Rather, the focus is on
the amorphous civil right of privacy aptly characterized by one American
17
jurist as a "haystack in a hurricane."'
Part II of this Article briefly addresses the history of the common law
right of privacy in the United States. Part III discusses the evolution of the
Kansas right of privacy, beginning with Kunz v. Allen, 18 the leading Kansas
case. Part IV addresses each of the four privacy claims as they have evolved
over time in Kansas, together with the specific defenses that courts have
recognized with respect to each variation. Part V addresses available
remedies and proof of damages.
Part VI addresses Kansas statutory
enactments that may implicate the Kansas right of privacy, either directly or
indirectly. Part VII identifies unresolved issues, including some that other
states have struggled to resolve but that Kansas courts have yet to address.
Part VIII concludes.
II.

HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Not often does a law review article lead the way for United States courts
to recognize a novel legal right that went unrecognized at common law.1 9 But
the earliest cases debating the existence of the personal right of privacy were a
direct outgrowth of an 1890 article co-authored by two law partners and
published in the law review of their alma mater.2 0 The trigger for the article
was the proliferation of news media commentary on the social events of the
21
day, facilitated by invasive new technologies.
By the close of the nineteenth century, photography had become

17. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956), quoted in William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 407 (1960). Some scholars have categorized these claims as
"privacy torts" to distinguish them from constitutional rights to privacy in the context of criminal law, search
and seizure, or constitutional privacy interests such as procreation and reproductive rights. E.g., DAVID A.
ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS ix (2002).
18. 172P. 532(Kan. 1918).
19.

RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 57, 63 (2010); see also FREDERICK S.

LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 61-62 (2009) (" 'The
Right to [sic] Privacy' was that rarest of law review articles: a treatise so well reasoned and so compellingly
argued that it helped to reshape American legal theory."). Although most American states have judicially
recognized the right of privacy, "other common law jurisdictions languish in a quagmire of indecision and
hesitancy." WACKS, supra, at 63. Underscoring the increasing worldwide interest in privacy rights is the
recent controversy in Great Britain about reporters employed by now-defunct News of the World hacking into
the voice mail of cell phone users, including Prince William and Prince Andrew. See James Poniewozik, The
Humbling of Rupert Murdoch, TIME MAGAZINE Aug. 8, 2011, at 32.
COMPUTER CRIME COMM., INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY (2004).

See generally ABA PRIVACY &

20. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890); see also Benjamin C. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right of Privacy and the Birth of the
Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002); Amy Gajda, What ifSamuel D. Warren Hadn't Married
a Senator's Daughter?:Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to Privacy", 2008 MICH. ST.

L.REV. 35, 35-36.
21. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT S (2008) (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20); see
also Bratman,supra note 20, at 624, 626; Gajda, supra note 20, at 59-60. See generally MILLS, supra, at 29-

35 (describing the evolution of increasingly intrusive technology and resulting challenges for protection of
personal privacy).

210
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ubiquitous in the United States. 2 2 George Eastman patented the Kodak box
camera on September 4, 1888, making photography accessible to the general
24
public.2 3 The portable Kodak camera enabled surreptitious photography,
25
triggering legal actions for violating "the right of circulating portraits."
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and his former law partner, future Supreme
Court justice Louis D. Brandeis, co-authored an article calling for a new cause
of action for invasion of privacy. 26 The motivation for the article may have
been "a series of articles in a Boston high-society gossip magazine, describing
Warren's swanky dinner parties." 27 In the age of "yellow journalism," the coauthors famously observed:
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance
2 8 of the enforcement of the more general right
of the individual to be let alone.

During the next decade, New York trial courts issued a series of
decisions enjoining defendants from publishing photographs of individuals
without their consent. 29 But in 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box, a deeply-divided New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment
22. See Robert E. Mensel, "KodakersLying in Wait": Amateur Photography and the Right of Privacy
in New York, 1885-1915,43 AM. Q. 24,28 (1991).
23. MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE GUARDIAN OF ALL THINGS: THE Epic STORY OF HUMAN MEMORY 187-

88 (2012). Eastman also originated the advertising slogan, "You Push the Button, We Do the Rest." The
Brownie camera, introduced in 1901 and advertised to sell for one dollar, was enormously popular. Id.
24. Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 401, 409-17 (1990)
(describing an uncontested 1890 injunction secured by renowned comic opera star Marion Manola, barring a
theater manager from distributing flash photographs taken during her performance); see Schuyler v. Curtis,
15 N.Y.S. 787, 789 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1891), aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1892) (reciting the facts
from Manola v. Stevens & Myers (unpublished)); see also Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285,
288 (Mich. 1899) ("We are not satisfied that ... one has a right of action either for damages or to restrain the
possessor of a camera from taking a snap shot at the passer-by for his own uses.").
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 196.
26. Id.
27. WACKS, supra note 19, at 53; see Prosser, supra note 17, at 383.

28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 205. Warren and Brandeis drew from Professor Thomas
Cooley's treatise, first published in 1878, which sketched the outlines of the general right of "personal
immunity" that would later become known more specifically as the right of privacy. "The right to one's
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity, to be let alone." Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97,
99-100, 109 (R.I. 1909) (emphasis added) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)) (declining to judicially

recognize a right of privacy absent legislative action); see also Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 294
(Mo. 1942) ("The basis of the right of privacy is the right to be let alone.") (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 444, § 135 (4th ed. 1932)).

29. E.g., Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1893) (enjoining a defendant newspaper
editor from publishing a photograph of a plaintiff actor-law student without his consent). But cf Murray v.
Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 266, 268-69 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1894), aff'd, 31 N.Y.S. 17 (CL
of C.P. 1894) (declining to enjoin an unauthorized distribution of photos of a plaintiff's infant daughter
absent a claim to vindicate property rights belonging to the plaintiff); see also Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22,
26 (N.Y. 1895) (declining to enjoin defendants from erecting a statue of a plaintiff's decedent, a private
philanthropist, on grounds that the subject of the alleged invasion of privacy was deceased). Note that the
earliest recognition of the right of privacy was by courts sitting in equity. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box, 64 N.E 442,444-47 (N.Y. 1902).
30. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (4-3 opinion) (holding that New York does not recognize the common law
right of privacy), rev'g 71 N.Y.S. 876 (App. Div. 1901). But see N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney
2009) (enacted 1903) (recognizing the civil right of privacy for using one's name or likeness, without written
consent, for trade or advertising purposes).
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awarding money damages to Abigail Roberson, an eighteen-year-old whose
photograph had been displayed without her consent on 25,000 posters
advertising baking flour.3 1 The court's refusal to recognize a cause of action
drew criticism from across the country. 32 In response to the public outcry, the
1903 New York Legislature hastily enacted a statutory right to privacy,
narrowly framed to provide a civil remedy for those whose names or
likenesses were 33appropriated for trade or advertising purposes without their
written consent.

Like New York, other state appellate courts declined to recognize a
common law right to privacy, instead deferring the issue to their respective
state legislatures. 34 A few states followed suit, enacting legislation similar to
New York's. 35 But several other
states, by judicial declaration, recognized a
36
more sweeping right to privacy.
The first to do so was Georgia.

In Pavesich v. New England Life

Insurance Co.,37 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had stated
a claim against an insurance company for printing his photograph in a

newspaper advertisement without his consent.38 In recognizing a civil
remedy for invasion of privacy, the court drew from natural law principles,
state and federal constitutional protections for individual liberty interests, and
a Georgia statute authorizing any court to "frame" a remedy, if necessary, for
a violation of any right within its jurisdiction. 39 In the end, the Georgia
Supreme Court boldly (and accurately) predicted that one day the right of
privacy would be generally recognized in the United States:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper limits...
the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without his consent
by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits
and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we venture to predict
that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view

31. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442. For a fascinating and humorous account of the aftermath of this decision
for Ms. Roberson and Chief Judge Parker, who authored the decision (and later ran for public office), see
Daniel J. Kornstein, The Roberson Privacy Controversy, HIST. SOC'Y OF CTS. OF ST. OF N.Y. NEWSL., 2006,

at 3, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/HSNLVol.4.pdf; LANE, supra note 19, at 64-70
(discussing Roberson controversy).
32. Bratman, supra note 20, at 648-50.
33. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51; see 1903 N.Y. Laws 308. The companion criminal statute, section 50,
defined the conduct as a misdemeanor. Section 51 created a private cause of action for a violation of the
criminal statute. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50; see 1903 N.Y. Laws 308.
34. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 99-100, 109 (R.I. 1909) (declining to judicially recognize
a right of privacy absent legislative action); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 75 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Wis. 1956) (declining
to judicially recognize the right because the state legislature had recently failed to enact bills that would have
done so).
35. Bratman, supra note 20, at 641 (citing Ken Gormley, One HundredYears of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L.
REv. 1335, 1354 n.90). Examples are Virginia (enacted in 1904) and Utah (enacted in 1909). See Note, The
Virginia "Right of Privacy'"Statute, 38 VA. L. REV. 117, 117 (1952).

36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra notes 37-40, 43 and accompanying text.
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
Id.at80-81.
Id. at 69-70 (quoting GA. CIv. CODE § 4929 (1895)).
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was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability .... 40

After Pavesich, other state and federal courts adopted varied
perspectives on the question. 4 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, following
the New York Court of Appeals, rejected the common law right of privacy in
1909, noting that it was "unable to discover the existence of the right of
privacy contended for. ' A2 But in 1911, the Missouri Court of Appeals,
relying on Pavesich, recognized a five-year-old boy's cause of action against
a Kansas City jewelry store for using his image in a newspaper advertisement
without consent. 43 Just a year later, a federal district court in Missouri, sitting

in equity, pointedly sidestepped what it called "the irreconcilable conflict of
opinions and views of courts of last resort in various jurisdictions 'A4 on the
question, observing that even if a right of privacy exists, it would surely not
extend to public educational institutions. 4 5 Thus, Vassar College was denied
an injunction against a Kansas City biscuit company for marketing "Vassar
Chocolates" in packaging that displayed knock-offs of the college seal,
46

pennant, and motto.

The nascent popularity of the cinema further complicated the privacy
issue. By the mid-1890s, the development of film projection systems enabled
vaudeville theaters across the country to exhibit moving pictures. 4 7 The early
"actuality" films, which peaked in popularity in 1903, depicted the events of
the day, much like contemporary news documentaries. 48 By 1918, the cinema
had reached Kansas City, Kansas, triggering a neighborhood dispute that
would soon lead the Kansas Supreme Court to recognize the common law
right of privacy.

40. Id. at 80-81; see ELDER, supra note 17, at § 1:1, at 1-7 (nearly all jurisdictions recognize a right of
privacy).
41. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 109 (R.I. 1909) (refusing to judicially recognize a right of
privacy following Roberson); Hillman v. Star Publ'g Co., 117 P. 594, 596 (Wash. 1911) (rejecting a right of
privacy absent legislation outlining parameters). But see Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox Cnty., 85 N.E.
32, 35 (Ind. App. 1908) (following Pavesich); Foster-Milbum, Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909)
(same); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080 (Kan. C. Ct. App. 1911) (same).
42. Henry, 73 A. at 109.
43. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1077. "If a man has a right to his own image as made to appear by his
picture, it cannot be appropriated by another against his consent." Id at 1078.
44. Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 985 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (bill in equity).
45. See id. at 984-85. The college sought to enjoin the biscuit company's commercial use of the
college name and emblems, contending that they were private property. Id. at 985. The federal district court
distinguished cases involving private persons suing for invasion of privacy, observing that a public corporate
institution depends on publicity to fulfill its role as an institution of higher education. Id. "Where a person is
a public character, the right of privacy disappears." Id (citing Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434 (D.
Mass. 1893)). This early perspective denying the right to privacy to public figures and entities on the theory
of waiver later evolved to recognize that public figures have a property interest in controlling the use of their
identities, notwithstanding that by definition they give up a good degree ofprivacy.
46. Id. at 984-85.
47. RICK ALTMAN, SILENT FILM SOUND 96-102 (2004).
48. PAUL BURNS, THE HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF CINEMATOGRAPHY ch. 15 (1997), availableat
http://www.precinemahistory.net/1895.htm; DOUGLAS GOMERY, SHARED PLEASURES: A HISTORY OF MOVIE
PRESENTATION INTHE UNITED STATES 7 (1992). For an example of an 1897 actuality film directed by
Auguste and Louis Lumire, see ARRIVAL OF ATRAIN (1897), availableat http://www.fandor.com/filns/
arrival of a-train.
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III. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY

One day in the early 1900s, Stella Kunz 4 9 was shopping for dry goods in
Allen & Bayne's store in Kansas City, Kansas. 50 Without her knowledge,
store employees took moving pictures of her for use in advertising clips later
exhibited in a local movie theater. Stella sued the store, claiming damages for
public humiliation and embarrassment. She alleged harm to her reputation
because her acquaintances believed that she had willingly allowed her
photograph to be used for commercial purposes. She successfully appealed
the judgment of the Wyandotte County District Court sustaining the store's
demurrer. 5 1 In deciding Kunz v. Allen in Stella's favor, Kansas joined a small
already judicially recognized a civil cause of
number of other states that had
52
action for invasion of privacy.
Quoting at length from Pavesich,53 the Kansas Supreme Court implicitly

held that Kunz had a privacy right and that a jury trial could vindicate its
violation. 54 The court rejected defendants' principal argument that Stella
Kunz had failed to prove damages, reasoning that the amount to compensate
her for pain, suffering, and humiliation was for the jury to decide. 55 The court
relied upon persuasive authority from Georgia 56 and Missouri 5 7 holding that
an individual has a property right in one's own picture and may sue for
unauthorized invasion of the right. 58 Furthermore, the court concluded that
Kunz could recover for invasion of privacy even without asserting and
offering evidence of special damages. 59 While available if proved, special
60
damages need not be alleged to state a claim for invasion of privacy.
49. In 1910, Stella Kunz, age 31, lived with her husband Jacob and her three young children in Kansas
City, Kansas. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WYANDOTTE CNTY. KAN. (1910).

50. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918). In a short article, an industry periodical observed:
A court in Kansas City, Kan., is going to have to decide whether or not the face of Mrs. Stella
Kunz, who lives on a rural route out of that city, is worth $2,000 in a moving picture advertising
the department store owned by Wilfred H. Allen and Charles H. Bayne, 642 Minnesota [Alvenue.
Mrs. Kunz has brought suit for that amount against the store proprietors, saying her picture was
taken while she was in the store and now is being used in moving picture films advertising it. She
sat for the films, without her knowledge, she declares, and is sure $2,000 wouldn't be too small a
remuneration for the use ofherself.
An Interesting Suit, 27 MOVING PICTURE WORLD 114, 114 (Chalmers Publ'g Co. 1916), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=saMbAQAAMAAJ&printsec= frontcover&source=gbsge summaryr&c
ad=0#v--onepage&q&f--false.
51. Kunz, 172 P. at 532.
52. See supra notes 37-40, 43 and accompanying text.
53. Kunz, 172 P. at 532 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S E. 68, 68, Syl. 11 (Ga.
1905)).
54. Id. at 533.
55. Id. at 532-33 (quoting Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68 Syl. 11). In effect, the court held that emotional
injury is presumed as a matter of law once the plaintiff establishes the other elements of the privacy claim.
Id.

56. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
57. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Kan. C. Ct. App. 1911).
58. Id. at 1079.
59. Kunz, 172 P. at 532-33.
60. Id. at 533 (quoting Munden, 143 S.W. at 1076 Syl. 4). The Kansas Supreme Court's holding in
Kunz concerning the minimum proof of damages was later clarified by the Tenth Circuit in a diversity case
applying Kansas law. See Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir. 1969). Manville had
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Notably, the court sidestepped whether it had the authority to create a right
not previously
recognized, either at common law or by legislative
1
enactment.

6

Kunz was thus among the earliest of the state appellate court decisions to
recognize invasion of privacy as a common law tort,6 2 repudiating the

decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box.63 Yet Kunz squarely embraced but one of the four distinct claims for

invasion of privacy that would ultimately be recognized by courts and
scholars64: (1) appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness; 65 (2) intrusion
upon seclusion; 66 (3) publicity given to private facts; 67 and (4) publicity
casting plaintiff in a false light. 68 Viewed narrowly based on the facts in
Kunz, the court recognized a privacy claim for misappropriation of name or
likeness, but no others. Several decades would elapse before the Kansas
Supreme Court recognized the other three common law claims for invasion of
privacy.

69

IV. FOUR DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY

Since Kunz, the common law right of privacy has evolved to include the
four distinct categories first elucidated by Professor Prosser in 1960.70 All
agreed to pose for a photograph for a Wall Street Journal feature article, but he told the defendant's agents
that he wanted no part in any advertising. Id. at 435. When his photo later appeared in a newspaper
advertisement, the plaintiff objected and later filed suit. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant, reasoning that no evidence was offered to show that the
advertisement had caused the plaintiff any embarrassment or mental anguish. Id. at 435, 437. As the Tenth
Circuit interpreted Kunz, "Kansas law requires a plaintiff in privacy cases to show some general damages
even though he is not required to prove either their amount or that there were special damages." Id. at 436.
The court refused to infer general damages as a matter of law: "without showing some general damages, [a
plaintiff] is entitled to recover only nominal damages." Id at 437. The court's holding implicitly confirms
the Kunz holding that injury is presumed, but clarifies that some evidence of compensable injury must be
offered for a plaintiff to recover anything more than nominal damages for the presumed injury.
61. The reasoning may have been implicit. The Kansas Constitution guarantees every citizen access to
the courts to remedy every wrong. KAN. CONST. bill of rights § 18 ("All persons, for injuries suffered in
person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without
delay.") Thus, it may be more accurate to say that the right to a judicial remedy was afait accompli once the
court recognized that Stella Kunz had suffered a legal harm as a direct result of the defendants' conduct. Cf
Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Kan. 1982) (observing that § 18 does not create rights of
action, but rather requires Kansas courts to afford a remedy for legally-recognized wrongs).
62. See Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908) (following
Pavesich); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Kan. C. Ct. App. 1911) (same); Foster-Milbum Co. v.
Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909) (same); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 499, 500 (La. 1905)
("Every one who does not violate the law can insist upon being let alone (the right of privacy). In such a case
the right of privacy is absolute."); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907)
(same).
63. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing Roberson).
64. Prosser, supra note 17, at 389; see also Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995-96 (1973) (listing and
defining four distinct privacy tort claims); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).

65. Kunz, 172 P. at 533; see infra Part IV.A.
66. See infra Part IVB.
67. See infra Part IV.C.
68. See infra Part IV.D.
69. The Kansas Supreme Court first recognized claims for intrusion on seclusion in 1973, publicity
given to private facts in 1972, and false light publicity in 1977. See infra Part IV.
70. Prosser, supra note 17, at 389. The Restatement (First)of Torts recognized only one claim for
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four are now well-established in Kansas law. 71 Each cause of action has
developed largely independent of the others, although several cases address
more than one category of privacy claim. This Part addresses each of the four
in turn, including specific defenses that Kansas courts have recognized over
the years. We begin with the classic version of invasion of privacy: the
unconsented use of a plaintiff s image or likeness for the defendant's benefit.
A. Appropriationof Name or Likeness

Thirty-five years would elapse before the Kansas Supreme Court had
another opportunity to address a claim along the lines of the one asserted by
Stella Kunz. In Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co.,72 a former employee alleged
that Boeing had published his photograph without his authorization in an
advertisement printed in various nationally circulated weekly news
magazines. 73 After reviewing authorities addressing the right of privacy, the
court observed that "inherent in the rule is an elasticity which must take into
account the particular circumstances of each case." 74 Because the photo had
been taken in the workplace with the plaintiffs consent while employed by
Boeing, the court concluded that he had "impliedly at least, consented to the
publication of his photograph.",75 When posing for the photo, Johnson knew
it would likely be published but neither objected nor imposed any conditions
on its publication. Further, no evidence was presented at trial that Boeing had
engaged in any coercion. 76 In short, while explicitly reaffirming Kunz, the
court concluded that Johnson had waived his privacy right by impliedly
consenting to Boeing's use of the photograph.77
invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939) (imposing liability on one who
"unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public" (emphasis added)). Note that each alternative recognized by the Restatement
in 1939 required some degree of publication.
71.

See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.61 (4th ed. 2012) (Right of Privacy). Kansas

follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defining and recognizing actionable invasion of privacy claims.
E.g., Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 228 (Kan. 2004) (quoting Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 6
(Kan. 1975)). The Kansas Supreme Court has left open the possibility that other causes of action for invasion
of privacy may be recognized in Kansas beyond the scope of the Restatement. See Werner v. Kliewer, 710
P.2d 1250, 1257 (Kan. 1985) ("Under the facts of this case we need not determine whether such a cause of
action might exist under other circumstances.").
72. 262 P.2d 808 (Kan. 1953).
73. Id. at 810.
74. Id. at 813.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. See id at 813-14. The court's reasoning apparently ignored the fact that Johnson had no reason to
anticipate the commercial use of the photograph in Boeing advertisements as opposed to its noncommercial
publication in internal business communications, to which he had implicitly acquiesced while employed
there. But even ifa plaintiff consents during the term of employment, other courts have acknowledged that
the defendant's use after plaintiff's resignation or termination may not exceed the scope of the consent given.
See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Tullos, 219 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying Georgia law); cf Dry v.
Boeing Co., No. 99-1402-WEB, 2002 WL 31730924, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 3, 2002) (unpublished)
(distinguishing Johnson;genuine issue of fact whether consent was limited to term of plaintiffs employment
and whether prior implied consent was limited or revoked). The Restatement (Second) of Torts endorses this
view. "[C]onsent to any publication, either of matter that is personally defamatory or of matter that invades
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In the alternative, the court in Johnson reasoned that the allegations
failed to show compensable injury. The testimony suggested that he filed suit
only after friends and relatives who had seen his photo began kidding him
about how much Boeing had paid him for its use. 78 Calling his lawsuit an
"afterthought," the court reasoned that "[t]o permit recovery under these facts
would expand the doctrine of privacy beyond all logical reasoning and stretch
it almost to the point of absurdity." 79 The court's alternative reasoning, while
more plausible than the implied consent rationale, also undercuts the holding
in Kunz that injury is presumed when the other elements of misappropriation

are proved. 80
In Johnson, the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its recognition of a
cause of action for invasion of privacy by appropriation of a plaintiff's
likeness, but without clearly articulating the elements of the claim. The court
also recognized that the plaintiffs consent, whether express or implied,
defeats a claim for misappropriation. However, the opinion did not clearly
delineate whether consent is an affirmative defense, or whether a plaintiff has
the burden to prove that a defendant's use was unauthorized. 8 1 The fact that
the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's demurrer in Johnson
82
suggests the latter view correctly describes the court's holding.
Since Johnson was decided in 1953, the Kansas appellate courts have
83
addressed a privacy claim for misappropriation on only one other occasion.
In Haskell v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.,84 the plaintiff, who was not a
public figure, sued the publisher of a Dodge City newspaper for reporting that
"wanted" posters had appeared around town displaying his photograph. The
text of the "wanted" poster, which was reprinted in the article, described
Haskell as frequently carrying weapons in public view and suggested that his
privacy, creates an absolute privilege so long as thepublication does not exceed the scope of the consent. The
consent given may be narrowly limited." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F cmt. b (1977)

(emphasis added).
78. Johnson, 262 P.2d at 812, 814.
79. Id. at 814.
80. See supra notes 55, 58 and accompanying text.
81.

But see PATrERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL

127.62 (4th ed.2012) (citing Johnson as

authority for the rule that consent is a defense to invasion of privacy); cf Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1041 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoting Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993)) ("As with
any intentional tort, consent is an absolute defense, even if improperly induced.").
82. The relevant syllabus paragraph of Johnson explains that the trial court properly granted
defendant's demurrer to the claim for "unauthorized publication.., of an advertisement... in which ...
appeared a photograph of plaintiff[]" because the plaintiff at least impliedly "waived such right" and because
the "plaintiff's evidence wholly failed to establish a cause of action." Johnson, 262 P.2d at 809. If consent
were an affirmative defense, it would have been improper for the trial court to grant a demurrer before trial,
and "unauthorized publication" would not be an element of the claim.
83. On occasion, state and federal district courts have addressed misappropriation claims in
unpublished opinions, always acknowledging Kunz as the seminal Kansas case. See Dry v. Boeing Co., No.
99-1402-WEB, 2002 WL 31730924, at *2-4 (D. Kan. Sept. 3, 2002) (distinguishing Johnson and denying a
defendant's motion for summary judgment in a terminated employee's misappropriation claim for using his
photo one year later in a Boeing newspaper advertisement); Hofer v. Cramer, No. 99C-00914, 1999 WL
34804096 (D. Kan. June 9, 1999) (rejecting a misappropriation claim because the mere use of name and
likeness in profitable media broadcast does not qualify as commercial use).
84. 990 P.2d 163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
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incarceration or commitment might be warranted. A photograph of the poster
accompanied the text of the article, which acknowledged that the plaintiff

lawfully carried weapons and that he was not actually "wanted" by law
85
enforcement.
The jury awarded Haskell $2,500 in damages against the newspaper for
misappropriating his name and likeness. The Kansas Court of Appeals
reversed, observing that Kansas appellate courts had never addressed whether
a newspaper's noncommercial publication pertaining to a matter of public
interest was privileged, thus defeating a misappropriation claim. 86 The court
reasoned that in this case, the jury instruction had failed to explain that the
87
newsworthiness privilege is a complete defense to a misappropriation claim.
Further, the trial court failed to define the element of "appropriation" in the
jury instruction so as to limit its meaning to commercial use. 88 Reasoning
that the news article pertained to carrying weapons, a matter of legitimate
public concern, the court concluded that the defendant had not used the
89
plaintiffs name and likeness for "commercial" purposes.
Relying on the policy justifications underlying Time, Inc. v. Hill,90 the

Kansas Court of Appeals explained that invasion of privacy claims must give
way when the press publishes material of public concern. 9 1
The
newsworthiness privilege applies as a matter of law when a person's name
and image are published in a news article, as long as the article pertains to a
85. Id.at 164.
86. Id. at 165.

87. See id Many states recognize newsworthiness as a qualified privilege to appropriation of name or
likeness rather than an absolute defense. See ELDER, supra note 17, §6:9. "The privilege is an absolute one
where the matter is true or the fault-re-falsity standards have not been met." Id.§ 6:9 n.1 (citing cases and
statutes). This is especially so when the plaintiff, as in Haskell, does not qualify as a public figure. See id.
§6:9. The Haskell court held that "[tihe privilege extends to matters about private individuals that are of
interest to the public." Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166. However, it cited only two district court cases, both
applying the law of other jurisdictions. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue and has
never cited Haskell.
88. Haskell, 990 P.2d at 165-66. But see PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.61 (4th ed.
2012) (commercial use not required); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652C & cmt. b (1977) (stating

that absent a limiting statute, the common law misappropriation rule does not require commercial use).
89. Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166-67 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d).

Just

because the defendant profited from the newspaper business, the court reasoned, did not transform the
newspaper's incidental publication of the plaintiffs name and likeness into a commercial use of the kind that
would support liability. Id. The court's reasoning was questionable at best. First, its out-of-context
reference to comment d failed to acknowledge comment b, which expressly disclaims any commercial use
requirement in the absence of a limiting statute. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b.

Second, Kansas has never enacted a statute limiting misappropriation claims to commercial uses. Third,
while Kunz and Johnson both involved uses of the plaintiffs' likenesses for the defendants' advertising
purposes, the Kansas Supreme Court has never held that commercial use is an essential element of the
misappropriation claim. Nor has itever had occasion to directly review or consider the intermediate
appellate court's reasoning in Haskell.
90. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
91. Time, Inc. v. Hill was later undermined by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which rejected the public
interest analysis for determining whether the New York Times v. Sullivan rule applies, at least in a false light
invasion of privacy context. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974). As noted by the
Kansas federal district court in Rinsley v. Brandt, Gertz signaled the Supreme Court's retun to the public
official/public figure standard in deciding whether New York Times applies. See Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F.
Supp. 850, 855 (D. Kan. 1977).

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 53

matter of public interest and plaintiffs name and likeness are used in relation
to that newsworthy subject. 92 Under these circumstances, the court reasoned,
the newspaper article pertained to a matter of public concern, and because
Haskell was the subject of the poster that was pictured in the news article, the
93
jury should have been instructed on the newsworthiness privilege.
In summary, to prove a claim for appropriation of name or likeness
under Kansas common law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant used
94
the plaintiffs name or likeness without consent for defendant's benefit.
95
Like the counterpart definition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
liability does not require use for a commercial purpose. 96 While the Kansas
Court of Appeals in Haskell suggested that a noncommercial use cannot
support a claim for misappropriation, that language was mere dicta because
the court held that the newsworthiness privilege applied as a matter of law.
The plaintiffs identifying information or likeness used for the
defendant's benefit need not be private in nature; in this respect a claim for
appropriation of name or likeness differs from other "privacy" claims. 9 7 At
least when a plaintiff's identity is used in relation to a matter of public interest
and concern, the defendant may avoid liability by asserting and proving the
newsworthiness privilege, although it is unclear whether the privilege is
absolute or qualified. 98 In dicta, the Kansas Supreme Court has suggested
that a claim for appropriation of name or likeness survives the death of the
99
plaintiff, unlike the other three common law privacy claims.
Defenses: Johnson was the first of several cases demonstrating that
Kansas law recognizes consent as a defense, not only to claims for
misappropriation of likeness, but also other common law claims for invasion
of privacy.' 0 0 However, scholars have observed that the absence of consent is
more accurately described as an element of the claim that the plaintiff must
assert and prove. 10 1 While the distinction may appear to be academic,
92. Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 166-67.
94. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.61 (4th ed. 2012).

95. "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). In the

absence of statute, the Restatement provision does not require proof that the defendant's use was for
commercial purposes. Id. at cmt. b. "[T]he nile ...applies ...when the defendant makes use of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one,

and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one." Id. (emphasis added). Kansas has
never enacted such a limiting statute, and the Kansas pattern jury instructions do not require commercial use
as an element of the claim. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS-CIVIL 127.61.
96. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS-CIVIL 127.61.
97. ELDER, supra note 17, § 6:10 & n.10.
98. See Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166.

99. Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 228 (Kan. 2004) (dicta) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 6521).
100. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.62; see also Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d

1032, 1041-42 (D. Kan. 1998).
101. See ELDER, supra note 17, §§ 2:12, 3:9, 4:8, 6:6; see also Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Or.,
N.A., 739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) ("Strictly speaking, consent is not a defense to invasion of
privacy. Rather, lack of consent is an element of the tort.").

But see Green v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 242
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treating consent as an affirmative defense eases the pleading burden on the
plaintiff and precludes pre-answer dismissal of a complaint for failure to
allege non-consent. If non-consent is an element of the claim, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's use was unauthorized.
Unlike some other states, 10 2 Kansas law does not require written or even
express consent to avoid liability-a plaintiffs consent may be implied.'0 3
Some authority suggests that the plaintiffs consent is vitiated if the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity exceeds the scope of the consent
10 4
granted.
As discussed earlier, the newsworthiness privilege may allow a
defendant to avoid liability for appropriation of name or likeness, although the
Kansas courts have not clearly addressed whether the privilege is absolute or
qualified. And while Kansas courts have not addressed the issue, many courts
10 5
have recognized an exception for incidental use of one's name or likeness,
suggesting that de minimis use negates the requirement that the defendant
must have used the plaintiffs name or likeness deliberately to exploit its
value. 106
The statute of limitations applicable to a claim of appropriation of name
or likeness is two years, based on the catchall provision for actions involving
"injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract,"
and not otherwise
10 7
enumerated in the Kansas statutes of limitation.
B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Invasion of privacy by intrusion on seclusion occurs when a person
intentionally intrudes on the plaintiffs solitude or seclusion, or his private
affairs or concerns, if a reasonable person would consider the intrusion highly
offensive. 108 According to Professor Prosser,
"the interest protected by this
109
branch of the tort is primarily a mental one."

S.W.3d 374, 379 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to hold that "lack of consent" is an element of a claim
for appropriation of name or likeness).
102. An example is New York. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009) (stating that, to
avoid liability, a defendant must establish plaintiff's written consent).
103. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.62 (citing Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262
P.2d 808 (Kan. 1953)) ("Consent may be shown from (his)(her) conduct and the surrounding
circumstances.").
104. See Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 435 (10th Cir. 1969) (dicta) (stating that a
plaintiff's verbal consent to be photographed for news article while expressly opposing advertising use did
not preclude judgment for using his photo for commercial advertising); cf Johnson, 262 P.2d at 813 (failing
to recognize limited scope of a plaintiffs consent); see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
105. See ELDER, supra note 17, § 6:8.
106. See, e.g., Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1980).
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (2013); see also Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.

1987); Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977). The discovery rule
applies to claims for
invasion of privacy. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b), (c).
108. Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995 (Kan. 1973) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B, at 103 (Tentative Draft No. 13 1967)).
109. Prosser, supra note 17, at 392.
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Other states recognized this distinct form of invasion of privacy as early
as 1881.11' While the Kansas Supreme Court generally recognized the
common law right of privacy in 1918, not until 1973 did the court have an
opportunity to squarely recognize intrusion on seclusion as a distinct cause of
1 11

action.

In Froelich v. Adair,112 an agent of the defendant, a divorcee, asked a
hospital orderly to obtain hair samples from William Froelich's hospital room.
Defendant's motive for obtaining the hair samples was to establish that
Froelich and her ex-husband were lovers, which would have defeated her exhusband's pending defamation claim against her. 113 Upon learning that the
defendant had secured strands of his hair from his hospital room, the plaintiff
sued for intrusion upon seclusion. 114 In defense, Adair argued that the hairs
were absolutely privileged information because she had obtained them in
connection with the defamation proceeding. 115 The trial court entered
judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a
new trial, reasoning that publication is not a required element of intrusion on
seclusion. Therefore, it was no defense to the claim that the intrusion had
yielded information that might be absolutely privileged if disclosed or
"published" in the context of another judicial proceeding.116
After Froelich,the Kansas courts have several times recognized invasion
of privacy claims for intrusion on seclusion against "[o]ne who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or
his private affairs or concerns ...if the intrusion would be highly offensive to
a reasonable man."' 117 However, the courts have been generous in
recognizing various exceptions that offer opportunities to assert affirmative
defenses.
Under certain circumstances, for example, a creditor may defeat a claim
for intruding on a debtor's seclusion based on the plaintiffs implied consent.
Soon after deciding Froelich, the Kansas Supreme Court considered a claim

110. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (recognizing a cause of action against a
physician for allowing an associate to assist in home childbirth without the plaintiffs' knowledge that he
lacked medical credentials or training; cf Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 29 N.E. 997 (N.Y. 1892) (holding a
defendant liable for consequential damages for constructing a train station adjacent to the third floor of the
plaintiffs building, depreciating its rental value).
111. See Froelich, 516 P.2d at 996 ("[A]n action for intrusion upon seclusion is one of first impression
in this state.").
112. 516 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1973) (5-2 opinion).

113. Id.at 995. Truth is an affirmative defense to a defamation claim. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722
P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1986) (4-3 opinion).
114. Froelich, 516 P.2d at 995-96.
115. Id. at 995; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F (1977) (adopting absolute privileges in
defamation actions for invasion of privacy claims); see also id §§ 583-592A (providing for absolute judicial
immunity).
116. Froelich, 516 P.2d at 997. Two justices dissented on the basis that the plaintiff failed to adequately
allege that the nature of the intrusion (as opposed to the information obtained) was so highly offensive as to
cause a reasonable person emotional harm. Id. at 998 (Fromme, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 994 Syl. 2.
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for intrusion upon seclusion against a creditor who had repeatedly called the
plaintiff after chronic illness caused her to default on her automobile loan. In
Dawson v. Associates Financial Services Co. of Kansas, 118 the court
concluded that the plaintiff debtor failed to state a cause of action for
intrusion. The court pointedly observed that the "right to be let alone is
qualified by the rights of others." 119 Specifically, when borrowing from a
creditor, a debtor "impliedly consents for the creditor to take reasonable steps
to pursue payment even though it may result in actual, though not actionable,
invasion of privacy." 120 In other words, a debtor's right to privacy is subject
122
12 1
to collect the debt.
to the creditor's right to take reasonable steps
A plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on a claim that investigating his criminal
history amounts to intrusion on seclusion. In Robison v. Board of County
Commissioners of Rush County,12 3 the Kansas Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs claim that a sheriffs deputy had intruded on his seclusion by
investigating court records and then disclosing to a city swimming pool
manager that plaintiff had once been charged with (but not convicted for)
indecent liberties with a child. 124 The court reasoned that Robison had at best
a "limited privacy interest" in his criminal history record.125 Moreover, the
criminal charges were part of public court records, which were readily
discoverable by anyone. Thus, Robison failed to show any intrusion into a
126
private concern.
The federal courts, applying Kansas law, have several times elaborated
on the elements of a claim for intrusion on seclusion. 12 7 To prove intrusion
118. 529P.2d 104(Kan. 1974).
119. Id. at 110 (citation omitted).
120. Id. The fact that the invasion was deemed "not actionable" also suggests that it is the plaintiffs
duty to assert non-consent (express or implied) in order to state a claim. See supra notes 81, 100-101 and
accompanying text.
121.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977). The Restatement (Second) of Torts

states:
there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiffs door, or calling him to the telephone on one
occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt. It is only when the telephone calls are
repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff,
that becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.
Id.

122. Dawson, 529 P.2d at 110. That said, a creditor may be liable on other grounds: i.e., for extreme
and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes the debtor emotional distress and resulting
bodily harm. Id. at 111. The Dawson court ultimately reversed a directed verdict on a plaintiffs outrage
claim, holding that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the creditors' dunning calls to plaintiffs
parents. Id. at 113.
123. No. 93,992, 2007 WL 518829 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007), rev. dismissed as moot (June 21,
2007).
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id. at *7.

126. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court addressed a related issue in Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Simmons, 50 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2002), a mandamus action against the Kansas Secretary of Corrections.
While acknowledging that KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4707 (2013) restricts dissemination of certain criminal
history and arrest information, the court expressly held that "a public agency may disclose court records,
information concerning an arrest, or the status of a pending investigation." Id. at 80 (citing Stephens v. Van
Arsdale, 608 P.2d 972 (Kan. 1980) and Kan. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 98-38 (1998)).
127. E.g., Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (D. Kan. 1998). The defendant must place itself

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 53

on seclusion, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) intentionally
intruded upon (2) plaintiff's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns,
128
and (3) that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Neither Kansas caselaw nor the Restatement directly addresses what
precisely constitutes an "intrusion." 129 An intrusion may be committed by
either (a) physically intruding or (b) using one's sensory faculties to intrude
on the plaintiffs right to be left alone. 130 Publication is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish the intrusion element, but the intrusion itself must
implicate the plaintiffs privacy or seclusion. 131 Moreover, the nature of the
intrusion must be sufficiently substantial. For example, odors from a
neighbor's cattle feedlot do not amount to an actionable intrusion on
seclusion, even if the smell from the livestock operation would be highly
32
offensive to a reasonable person.1
The intrusion must be intentional, but malice is not a necessary
element. 133 "The precise motives for invasion of privacy are unimportant.
Defendant's action, rather than precise motives accompanying the act or
134
conduct, is the criterion of liability."
The defendant must intrude upon a plaintiffs solitude or private affairs
or concerns. Thus, a plaintiff does not state a claim if the alleged intrusion
occurred in a public place, such as open court. 135 Nor does the defendant
physically, or by means of its senses, within the plaintiff's zone of privacy. Id.(citing Ali v. Douglas Cable
Commc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996).
128. Id. at 1040 (citingAli, 929 F. Supp. at 1381).
129. Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009). By
statutory enactment, strip searches and body cavity searches in violation of the constraints imposed by section
22-2521(a)-(b) or section 22-2522 qualify as intrusions upon seclusion as a matter of law. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2523; see also infra notes 388-391 and accompanying text. Whether a violation of recently
enacted criminal "breach of privacy" statutes may also support a private cause of action for damages remains
an open question in Kansas. See infra notes 383-423, 464-465 and accompanying text.
130. Peterson, 2009 WL 3126229, at *3 (citing Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 189 (Kan. Ct. App.
1993)). The defendant "must 'place [it]self physically, or by means of [its] senses, within the plaintiff's zone
of privacy.' " Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (quoting All, 929 F. Supp. at 1382) (alteration in original). In
Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., the federal district court granted summary judgment to a defendant
automobile manufacturer for a plaintiff employee's failure to meet the intrusion element. See Gretencord v.
Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D. Kan. 1982) The plaintiff sued his former employer for
discharging him for refusing to comply with a random security search of his vehicle as he left the employer's
parking lot, consistent with the employer's written policy. Id. at 332. The court granted summary judgment,
holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that any intrusion had occurred. Id.
at 333.
131. Peterson, 2009 WL 3126229, at *3 (citing Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973)). In
Hartman v. Meredith Corp., bail bondsmen sued a broadcaster for airing photographs of them in open court
with their clients, who had been charged with unlawful gambling, while the announcer named the individuals
charged. See Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (D. Kan. 1986). The court dismissed the
bondsmen's claim for intrusion upon seclusion for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the broadcast
occurred in a public place-open court. Id. at 1018.
132. Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). "The nature of the intrusion involved
[here-the smell caused by the activities conducted on defendant's property-]is distinguishable from that
contemplated under Kansas law or the Restatement." Id.The holding could have simply turned on the fact
that the defendants neither physically intruded nor used their sensory faculties to intrude on plaintiffs
seclusion; ironically, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the defendants' conduct was highly offensive to
the plaintiff's sensory faculties.
133. See Froelich, 516 P.2d at 997 (rejecting the implied argument that malice is a required element).
134. Id.
135. Hartman, 638 F. Supp. at 1018 (holding that bail bondsmen who were standing with their clients in
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intrude on the plaintiffs private affairs by investigating information, such as
prior criminal charges, already a matter of public record. 136 Further, a
plaintiff who has voluntarily disclosed information that the defendant has
137
publicized to others cannot state a claim for intrusion on seclusion.
Finally, the nature of the defendant's intrusion must have been offensive
to an ordinary reasonable person as a result of conduct to which a reasonable
person would strongly object.' 38 Both the manner of the intrusion and the
nature of the information sought must be highly offensive. 13 9 The plaintiff's
subjective reaction to the defendant's conduct is therefore not dispositive
140
because the test is an objective one.
As observed earlier, creditors appear to receive favorable consideration
141
when charged with invasion of privacy, including intrusion on seclusion.
In Moore v. R.Z. Sims Chevrolet-Subaru,Inc., 142 a prospective purchaser sued
a dealership for intrusion on seclusion based on an unsuccessful attempt to
repossess a truck from plaintiffs place of business, a McPherson caf6, after
she was unable to secure financing. The dealership's agent entered the caf6
kitchen and office area to speak with her. The Kansas Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's judgment for plaintiff, reasoning that because of the
parties' debtor-creditor relationship, the caf6 kitchen was plaintiffs business
location, not an area of seclusion or solitude. Therefore, the agent's entry did
not amount to a substantial intrusion that a reasonable person would find
143
highly offensive.
Employers also appear to fare favorably when discharged employees sue
for intrusion on seclusion. In Frye v. IBP, Inc.,144 the federal district court
held that when an employer demanded a urine sample from an employee for
the purpose of drug testing, consistent with the employer's stated purpose of

open court could not sue a broadcaster for intrusion upon seclusion).
136. Robison v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Rush Cnty., No. 93,992, 2007 WL 518829, at *7 (Kan. Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2007). But see Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, 109 P.3d 1226, 1233, 1237, 1238 (Kan. 2005)
(indicating that agencies have the discretion to disclose personal identifying information contained in public
records under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-22 1(a)(30) (2013)).
137. Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009)
(citing C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 n.l (D. Minn. 1999)). "[U]nder Kansas
law the disclosure of properly obtained information does not constitute an intrusion sufficient to make out a
claim of invasion of privacy under the theory of intrusion upon seclusion." Id.
at *3.
138. Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Ali v. Douglas Cable
Commc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996)).
139. Id.In retrospect, this holding may have been a basis for denying recovery in Froehlich. See supra
notes I11-117 and accompanying text. Although the nature of the intrusion into the plaintiff's hospital room
may have been offensive, the nature of the information secured (combings from the plaintiff's hairbrush and
discarded bandage) certainly was not. See Froehlich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995 (Kan. 1973).
140. Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (citation omitted).
141. E.g., Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 7 (Kan. 1975) (finding no actionable invasion of privacy
based on the frequency of a creditor's calls to a debtor's business to collect on a note absent evidence of
intrusion into a private place).
142. 738 P.2d 852 (Kan. 1987).
143. Id.
at 858.
144. 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 1998). This was an issue of first impression applying section 652B
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to employer drug-testing policies and procedures. Id.
at 1040.
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maintaining a safe place to work, the nature of the information sought was not
unreasonable. Therefore, the intrusion could not be viewed as "highly
offensive" by a reasonable jury. 14 5 This was true even if, as the plaintiff
alleged, the employer had acted on unreliable reports or lacked an
objectively
14 6
reasonable suspicion that the employee had engaged in drug use.
A claim for intrusion upon seclusion does not survive the plaintiff. 147 In
Nicholas v. Nicholas,148 for example, a husband filed suit against his
estranged wife for invasion of privacy for breaking into his home and taking
documents and financial records. He died while the proceeding was pending.
The court acknowledged that invasion of privacy is not among the claims
listed in Kansas Statutes Annotated section 60-1802 that abate upon a party's
death, nor is it listed in section 60-1801 as an action that survives the death of
a party. 149 In the absence of any statute expressly authorizing survival, the
court held that the decedent's claim did not survive. 150 The court reasoned
that the emotional injuries triggered by intrusion on seclusion are so personal
in nature that a jury would have to resort to speculation in the absence of
plaintiffs trial testimony. 151
Finally, a police officer's entry into a private home or apartment without
a warrant or a legally recognized exception to the warrant requirement may
amount to an invasion of privacy; unless justified by legal privilege, the
15 2
officer's entry will support an inhabitant's action for invasion of privacy.
Probable cause alone is not a sufficient justification for a warrantless search
or entry into a private residence: to avoid liability, officers must show exigent
circumstances justifying an immediate warrantless search. 153 As might be
expected, the sanctity 1of
one's home is a common theme in cases alleging
54
seclusion.
on
intrusion
Defenses: As noted earlier, 155 Kansas law generally recognizes consent
as a defense to any cause of action for invasion of privacy, 156 although more
accurately the absence of consent is an element of the claim that the plaintiff
must assert and prove. 157 Under Kansas law, a plaintiffs consent to an
145. Id. at 1042.
146. Id.
147. Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 226-27 (Kan. 2004).
148. 83 P.3d 214 (Kan. 2004).
149. Id. at 226-27.
150. Id. at 228-29.
151. Id. at 228.
152. Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327-28 (Kan. 1977) (citing KAN. CONST. bill of rights § 15; Dotson
v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d I (Kan. 1975); Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1973); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)). If an officer searches with a warrant, however, the search is privileged.
See id. at 328.

153. Id.
154. See ELDER, supra note 17, § 2:5.

155. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
156. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL § 127.62 (4th ed. 2012).

157. ELDER, supra note 17, §§ 2:12, 3:9, 4:8, 6:6; see also Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A.,
739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or. App. 1987); supranote 101.
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intrusion may be either express or implied. 158 However, if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant fraudulently secured the plaintiffs consent, the defense
evaporates. 159
As with privacy claims for appropriation of name or likeness, the
plaintiffs consent is an absolute defense to a claim for intrusion on
seclusion. 160 Moreover, consent may be inferred. For example, when an
employee agrees at hiring to provide a urine sample upon request, the
inference of consent is not negated just because his refusal to comply might
result in an adverse employment action. 16 1 And when an employee
knowingly accepts employment in a workplace that requires drug testing, the
employee implicitly consents, at least to the extent that the testing is
consistent with the employer's policy and protocol. 162 However,6 3 implied
consent is negated if the employer exceeds the scope of that policy. 1
Even if an unconsented intrusion occurs, a plaintiff thereafter may waive
or relinquish the right of privacy either explicitly or implicitly. 164 In Vespa v.
Safety FederalSavings & Loan Association,165 the court held that a plaintiffs
conduct amounted to a waiver of her right of privacy. 166 There, a banker
visited the plaintiffs home to discuss her options after the bank had
purchased the home at a foreclosure sale. After the banker identified himself
and presented his business card, the plaintiff neither refused him permission
to enter the home nor asked him to leave. His visit lasted three hours. Even
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the court
67
concluded that she suffered no actionable invasion of privacy. 1
While the newsworthiness privilege, if applicable, is at least a partial
defense to a claim for appropriation of name or likeness, 16 8 it is not a viable
defense to a claim for intrusion on seclusion because neither publication nor
publicity is a necessary element of the claim. 169 However, a county or district
158.

PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.62 ("Consent may be shown from (his)(her)

conduct and the surrounding circumstances.") (citing Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808 (Kan.
1953)).
159. See Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 844 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (dicta) ("If the
purported consent was fraudulently induced, there was no consent.").
160. Frye v. I.B.P., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Curtright v. Ray, No. 902034-V, 1991 WL 179385, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1991)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1041-42.
163. Id. at 1042. Once again, this reasoning suggests that implicit consent is vitiated if a defendant's
conduct exceeds the scope of the consent. But see Johnson, 262 P.2d at 813-14.
164. Vespa v. Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 P.2d 878, 881 (Kan. 1976) (citing Johnson, 262 P.2d
at 809). In Kansas, waiver is an affirmative defense. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-208(c) (2013).
165. 549 P.2d 878.
166. See id. at 881.
167. Id. (affirming summary judgment for defendant).
168. See supra notes 87, 91-93 and accompanying text.
169. Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973) (stating that the qualified privilege that is
applicable to defamation claims does not apply to a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, for which publication
is not an element). This position has been criticized as "dubious" and inconsistent with the consensus in
other states that the set of qualified privileges that is applicable to defamation law generally applies to claims
for invasion of privacy. See ELDER, supranote 17, § 2:13.
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attorney enjoys absolute immunity for investigating a plaintiffs private and
business affairs 170 based on "[t]he same policy considerations requiring
absolute immunity for communications made during the course of a
prosecution * ,,171
The two-year statute of limitations applies to claims for intrusion upon
seclusion, consistent with the catchall provision for actions not otherwise
enumerated 2 involving "injury to the rights of another, not arising on
' 17

contract."

C. Publicity Given to PrivateFacts
At about the same time the Kansas Supreme Court recognized an action
for intrusion on seclusion, it also expressly acknowledged the possible
173
existence of a third privacy tort. In 1972, in Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores,
the Kansas Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of a privacy claim
based on publicity given to private facts. 17 4 The Restatement defines the
claim as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person,
175
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.

Munsell, a truck driver who formerly worked for the defendant, was
discharged after he admitted in writing to having knowingly padded his time
slips and trip reports over a ten-year period. 1 76 Consistent with its union
contract, the employer provided a copy of plaintiffs signed statement to his
union, triggering Munsell's suit alleging defamation and invasion of privacy,
among other claims. 1 77
The jury awarded some $30,000 in actual
178
damages,
and the defendant appealed.
170. Sampson v. Rumsey, 563 P.2d 506, 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
171. Id. "[Tlhe power of the district attorney to investigate alleged violations within his jurisdiction is
unquestionable and his motive in so doing may not be the subject of a lawsuit against him." Id.
172. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (2013); Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977).
173. 494 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1972).
174. Id. at 1075 (dicta). Long before Munsell, a federal district court in New York considered whether
Kansas law recognized a claim of publicity given to private facts. See Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 34 F. Supp.
19, 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), affd, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). In that case, The New Yorker had published
two biographical articles and a photograph of the plaintiff, who had become known as a child prodigy years
before when, at the age of eleven, he lectured to Harvard professors on the fourth dimension. Id. at 19-20.
The plaintiff claimed that the nationally-circulated magazine violated his common law right of privacy in
several states that by then had recognized such a right. Noting that Kansas courts had not yet considered a
claim for public disclosure of private facts, the court declined to speculate as to whether Kansas or any other
state would do so. See id at 20-21. As noted in this Article, the Kansas Supreme Court would eventually
recognize the claim, but not until the mid-1970s.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
176. Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1066-67. Recall that in 1972, the Restatement (First)of Torts recognized
only one form of invasion of privacy. See supra note 70. With respect to Munsell's privacy claim, the jury
was instructed on wrongful intrusion of one's private activities (the equivalent of intrusion upon seclusion),
even though the facts alleged suggested publicity given to private facts. See Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1072.
177. Id. at 1068-69.
178. Id. at 1066, 1072.
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While recognizing a privacy claim for what would later be known as
giving publicity to private facts, 17 9 the Kansas Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "only unwarranted invasions of the right of privacy are
actionable." 180 In this instance, the employer had justifiably inquired about
Further, the privacy claim for
the plaintiffs padded time slips.
communicating relevant facts to the union was subject to qualified privilege to
the same extent as plaintiffs defamation claim. 18 1 Under the circumstances,
qualified immunity applied as a matter of law because the employer had18 a2
contract obligation to report disciplinary actions against union members.
Therefore, the plaintiff could not recover for either defamation or invasion of
had acted with actual malice, and the jury should
privacy unless the employer
18 3
have been so instructed.
Soon after Munsell, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a rapid
succession of claims alleging facts that would soon be categorized in the
Restatement as giving publicity to private facts.18 4 Each elucidated a distinct
element of the claim.
First, the facts given publicity must be private facts. In In re Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,185 a divided Kansas Supreme Court
enforced a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Kansas Commission on Civil
Rights while investigating a complaint alleging employment discrimination

179. The Munsell court observed that Johnson "suggested that the right of privacy is violated where
there is...the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern."
Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1074-75 (citing Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808 (Kan. 1953)).
180. Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 1075. In considering the defamation claim, the court discussed the qualified privilege defense
at length. Id. at 1073. It noted:
[A]bsolute privilege is recognized as applying to cases in which the public service or the
administration of justice requires complete immunity as in legislative, executive or judicial
proceedings.... A qualified privileged publication is one made on an occasion which furnishes a
prima facie legal excuse for making it unless some additional facts are shown which alter the
character of the publication. It comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual
malice and with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true. Where a
defamatory statement is made in a situation where there is a qualified privilege[,] the injured party
has the burden of proving not only that the statements were false, but also that the statements were
made with actual malice-with actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure .... The
question whether or not a publication is privileged is a question of law to be determined by the
court.

Id.(emphasis added) (citing Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 340 P.2d 396 (Kan. 1959)). The court
equated the qualified privilege defense to a "prima facie legal excuse" for making the defamatory statement
absent the plaintiff's showing of actual malice.
182. Id. at 1073.
183. Id. The Munsell court carefully distinguished claims for defamation from claims for invasion of
privacy based upon the nature of the injury. Id.at 1075. Although defamation redresses injuries to
reputation, invasion of privacy compensates "injured feelings or mental suffering." Id.Later courts would
distinguish the two causes of action on other, more-nuanced grounds: specifically, the facts required to
establish the "publication" element of defamation arenot sufficient to support the "publicity" element
required for two of the four kinds of invasion of privacy claims. Moreover, to support invasion of privacy,
the matter publicized must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, while for defamation it is sufficient
that the plaintiff show falsity and harm to reputation.
184.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see supra notes 175-176 and accompanying

text.
185. 531 P.2d 455 (Kan. 1975) (4-3 decision).
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based on the complainant's Mexican-American national origin. The employer
alleged that the complainant had been lawfully terminated after his
background investigation revealed numerous criminal convictions, all for
relatively minor offenses. The Commission's subpoena sought arrest and
conviction records of others hired for the same job to determine whether the
employer's stated reason for plaintiff's termination was merely a pretext.
The employer objected to the subpoena, arguing that releasing arrest and
conviction records of other employees would subject it to claims for invasion
of privacy. 186 The court disagreed, holding that a successful claim for giving
publicity to private facts, which was expressly recognized, 187 requires that the
disclosed facts were indeed private ones. 188 Kansas law does not protect an
employee's arrest and conviction records from disclosure; 189 nor does it
protect the confidentiality of an applicant's communications to a prospective
employer. 190
Therefore, the trial court should have enforced the
Commission's subpoena because the information sought concerning other
Santa Fe employees was public,
not private information, and therefore did not
91
implicate their privacy rights.1
Later in 1975, the Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the same principle in
Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co.1 92 The plaintiff, a former police
officer, alleged that a newspaper had invaded his privacy when it published
allegations of misconduct initially made ten years earlier while he was a
public employee. 193 The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant, 194 reasoning that the plaintiff did not claim the published
information was false; moreover, the news accounts pertained to his conduct
while a public official. 19 5 The court observed once again that "[o]nly
unwarranted invasions of the right of privacy are actionable," 196 and as a
matter of policy, public debate may include criticism of government officials,
197
including police officers.

Therefore, the plaintiff had no right of privacy with respect to his

186. Id. at 461,468.
187. Id. at 469.
188. Id.
189. See Robison v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Rush Cnty., No. 93,992, 2007 WL 518829, at *7 (Kan. Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2007) (holding that the disclosure of criminal charges involving indecent liberties that did not
result in convictions did not violate a plaintiffs right of privacy).
190. In re Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 531 P.2d at 469.
191. Id. at 469-70. Three justices dissented on the basis that the criminal records of other employees
were not discoverable because they were not reasonably relevant to the plaintiff's complaint. Id.at 470
(Fromme, J., dissenting).
192. 543 P.2d 988 (Kan. 1975).
193. Id. at989-90.
194. Id.
at 996.
195. Id."The purpose of the tort is to protect an individual against unwarranted publication of private
facts. Once facts become public the right of privacy ceases. We do not see how public facts, once fully
exposed to the public view, can ever become private again." Id. at 995-96.
196. Id.
at 992-93 (quoting Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 (Kan. 1972)).
197. Id.
at 992 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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conduct while in public office. Borrowing "principles ... established in the
field of defamation law, [which] have a direct bearing on the closely related
field of privacy," 198 the court reasoned that the defendant newspaper had an
absolute privilege to communicate truthful matters concerning public
officials. 199 The time elapsed since the plaintiff left office did not confer a
right of privacy with respect to the incidents in question, for which he had
waived his privacy rights. 200 The court specifically rejected plaintiffs
reliance on California's "test of 'current newsworthiness,' requiring a caseby-case evaluation of the current public interest, at least where the facts
published are public facts concerning one who is or was a public official." 2 0 '
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court held that disclosure of facts that
are a matter of public record, even if potentially embarrassing, cannot support
a claim for giving publicity to private facts. In Vespa, the vice-president of
defendant bank, which had purchased plaintiffs home at a foreclosure sale,
discussed related matters with a realtor. The court rejected plaintiffs
argument that the disclosure invaded her right of privacy by disclosing private
facts, reasoning that the details of the foreclosure were not private:
The orders of the court... decreeing foreclosure, ordering a sale and fixing the
redemption rights of the owners were a part of [the] public record. A discussion
of those matters between [the banker] and a realtor invade[d] no right oWrvacy
of the plaintiff, and cannot be the basis for her claim against [the bank].

But a defendant does not necessarily avoid liability under Kansas law for
disclosure of personal identifying information just because the facts happen to
be in public records. Facts do not automatically lose their private character
when they become part of a public record.20 3 In Data Tree, LLC v. Meek,204 a
case of first impression, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed an order denying
injunctive and declaratory relief to a data-mining business 20 5 that challenged
198. Id. "That is to say, if the circumstances are such that there is a qualified privilege to communicate
even defamatory falsehoods about an individual, so long as it is done without actual malice [as with public
figures], there is an absolute privilege to communicate matters which are true." Id. (citing Munsell, 494 P.2d
at 1065-66 Syl. 4).
199. See id. at 993. In dicta, the court distinguished situations not involving public officials, observing
that under Gertz, private individuals are entitled to greater protection from defamatory falsehoods than public
officials. Rawlins, 453 P.2d at 992 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Gobin v. Globe
Publ'g Co., 531 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1975)).
200. Id. at 996.
201. Id. (rejecting Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931)). See generally ELDER, supra note 17, § 3:18 (discussing the
newsworthiness privilege and the effect of the passage of time and noting California's minority rule).
202. Id. at 880.
203. See ELDER, supra note 17, § 3:15 n.31 ("cases are divided as to whether all matters of public record
may be freely publicized with impunity or only those involving matters of legitimate public concern"); see
also id § 2:17 (discussing public records with respect to claims for intrusion upon seclusion).
204. 109 P.3d 1226 (Kan. 2005).
205. The plaintiff sought the information in conjunction with its business of collecting and providing
real estate information from public records and disseminating the information to its commercial clients. Id. at
1230. The commercial nature of the plaintiff's desired use of the information was a significant factor in the
court's balancing analysis. Id. at 1238. For an overview of the market for data collection, aggregation, and
dissemination, and the multiple uses of data for credit reporting, insurance underwriting, and direct
marketing, see PAUL H. RUBIN & THOMAS M. LENARD, PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF PERSONAL
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redaction fees assessed by the Sedgwick County Register of Deeds. The
defendant argued that the fees were justified under the Kansas Open Records
Act ("KORA") to redact personal identifying information, including Social
Security numbers, mothers' maiden names, and dates of births, from the bulk
public records that the plaintiff sought. The trial court granted summary
judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, observing that KORA carved out
a limited discretionary exception from disclosure for "[p]ublic records
containing information of a personal nature where the public disclosure
thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
20 6
privacy."
The court observed that the KORA exception did not prohibit a record
custodian from disclosing personal information, but rather granted discretion
whether to release information within its scope. 20 7 The court held that the
information in question was "of a personal nature" within the meaning of the
statutory exception and that the plaintiff had requested it for the commercial
purpose of selling it to clients, not for a public purpose. Because disclosure in
this instance would not serve KORA's principal public purpose, the court
20 8
balanced the respective interests in favor of protecting privacy.
Specifically, the register of deeds "did not abuse his discretion in determining
that public disclosure of the personal information within the documents
20 9
requested constituted a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Even if the facts disclosed by the defendant are private, the court may
deem the disclosure subject to qualified privilege as a matter of law, thus
shielding the defendant from liability unless the plaintiff establishes malice as
that term was defined in Munsell.2 10 For example, in 1975, the Kansas
Supreme Court rejected a privacy claim against a life insurance company for
publicizing a prospective insured's medical information to a private, nonprofit
trade association for the purpose of determining the underwriting risk.2 11
Health insurance companies routinely used the trade association to exchange
confidential medical information among its 700 insurer members. The
plaintiff sued after the defendant denied his application for a life insurance
INFORMATION 15-16, 24-26 & fig. 1 (2002).
206. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(a)(30) (2013). A similar exception appears in the federal Freedom of

Information Act ("FOIA"). See 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012).
207. DataTree, LLC, 109 P.3d at 1234.
208. The court rejected the plaintiffs efforts to apply
principles dealing with the tort of invasion of personal privacy to the analysis of what would

constitute a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' [T]his would divorce the analysis
from the underlying public purpose of the KORA. It appears that courts generally analyze the
issue by balancing the privacy interests of the individual with the public's need to know.

Id.at 1237 (citations omitted). The court's reasoning appears to undercut any argument that the "clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy" clause might require a public agency to sort out the nuances of privacy law
(and its various qualified privileges) in exercising its discretion whether to release personal information from
public records.
209. Id.at 1238.
210. See supra note 181.
211. Senogles v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1975).
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by disclosing his
policy, arguing that the insurer violated his right of2privacy
12
health information to a third-party trade association.
While the plaintiff had agreed on the life insurance application that the
defendant insurer could acquire information about his health, he did not
consent to its disclosure to others. Nevertheless, the court held the alleged
invasion was justified, observing once again that a "warranted" invasion of
privacy is not actionable. 2 13 The court concluded that communicating the
plaintiffs health information to the trade association was subject to qualified
proof
privilege as a matter of law, so the plaintiff could not recover absent
2 14
information.
the
disseminating
in
malice
that defendant acted with
The court's rationale was based on the same policy justifications
underlying its earlier privacy decisions holding that certain disclosures by
creditors and former employers are subject to qualified privilege as a matter
of law. Once again drawing from defamation law, the court reiterated the
common law definition of qualified privilege it had adopted and approved in
Faberv. Byrle 2 15 :
A communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even
though it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and
although the duty is not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect
obligation. The essential elements of a conditionally privileged communication
may accordingly be enumerated as good faith, an interest to be upheld, a
statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication
in a proper manner and to proper parties only. The privilege arises from the
necessity of full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which
have an interest or duty, and is not restricted within any narrow
the parties
2 6
limits. 2

If the court determines as a matter of law that the qualified privilege applies, a
plaintiff cannot recover without proving malice as defined in traditional
2 17
defamation law.
Even if the facts are private and their disclosure is not warranted or
conditionally privileged, the private facts are privileged if they pertain to a
matter of legitimate public concern. 2 18 Kansas law is less than clear whether
newsworthiness amounts to a qualified or an absolute privilege. In Werner v.
Kliewer,2 19 a patient sued her psychiatrist for disclosing private facts about
her unstable mental condition in a letter to the court in which her divorce

212. Id. at 1359-60.
213. Id. at 1361 (quoting Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1075 (Kan. 1972)).
214. See id. at 1364.
215. 229P.2d718(Kan. 1951).
216. Senogles, 536 P.2d at 1363 (quoting Faber,229 P.2d at 721).
217. See id. at 1363; infra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing the common law definition of
"malice").
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).

219. 710 P.2d 1250 (Kan. 1985).
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action was then pending. 22 The court rejected her claim for publicity given
to private facts on alternative grounds. 22 1 First, the disclosed facts could not
be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person under the
circumstances, and it was doubtful that the letter was given the required
widespread publicity to support the claim. 222 In this case, the defendant's
letter was disclosed only to the court services officer, judge, and counsel, all
officers of the court. 2 2 3 Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that the facts did not pertain to any legitimate public concern, noting the
224
strong public policy in favor of child welfare in custody proceedings.
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for giving
225
publicity to private facts.
Werner's rationale is somewhat puzzling because the court need not
have reached the public interest question. Furthermore, because the plaintiff
was not a public official or even a public figure, any such privilege would be
less than absolute under the Rawlins dicta, even if the private information
pertained to a matter of public concern. Nevertheless, the information was
included in a letter from a prospective medical witness sent to the district
court and was disclosed solely to officers of the court. The court may have
226
sidestepped the question of absolute privilege based on judicial immunity
because the information in the defendant's letter was subject to the physicianpatient privilege, 22 7 and therefore would not have been discoverable or even
admissible in evidence. However, the court specifically held under 228
the
circumstances that the plaintiff had waived any physician-patient privilege.
Unlike the publication element of a defamation claim, widespread
publicity of private facts is generally required to impose liability for giving
publicity to private facts. 2 2 9 In Fields v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co.,230 Fields claimed that his employer had improperly publicized
allegations that he had been having an affair with a coworker. Four agents of
220. Id. at 1252-53.
221. Id. at 1256.
222. Id.
223. Id.;seealsoid at 1253.
224. See id. at 1256-57 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 1257.
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1977).
Testimony to be privileged need not be material or relevant to the issues before the court, nor does
the fact that the testimony is offered voluntarily and not in response to a question prevent it from
being privileged if it has some reference to the subject of the litigation. If the defamatory [or
private] matter is published in response to a question put to the witness by either counsel or by the
judge, that fact is sufficient to bring it within the protection of the privilege, notwithstanding the
fact that it is subsequently adjudged to be inadmissible.
Id. at § 588 cmt. c.
227. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427(d) (2013).
228. Werner, 710 P.2d at 1255.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. But see Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *1, 4 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (relaxing widespread dissemination requirement
when sexually-explicit photos of a plaintiff were sent by email to "a handful" of the plaintiffs family and
friends).
230. 985 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Kan. 1997).

2014]

The Right to Be Let Alone

the employer received the private information on audiotape from an unknown
third party, and in turn communicated it to two other persons. 231' The court
rejected the claim, reasoning that the employer's agents had not publicized the
allegations widely enough to support the "publicity" element.23 2 Unlike
defamation, a claim for giving publicity to private facts requires proof that the
information was disseminated to so many individuals, or in such a manner, as
to virtually ensure that the information will "become [a matter] of public
knowledge." 233 Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the disclosure was
sufficiently widespread.23 4

Since 1991, the only reported cases addressing privacy claims for giving
publicity to private facts under Kansas law have been decided by federal
district courts. 23 5 Like Fields, several of those cases address the requirement
that the publicity given to private facts must be widespread.236

With one

exception, the recent cases raise no new legal issues.
But in 2009, an unpublished federal district court opinion addressed a
novel claim. 23 7 Peterson sued her former boyfriend after he sent an email
message to a few of plaintiffs family members and friends. 238 Attached to
the email were digital copies of sexually explicit photos of plaintiff, which the
defendant had previously taken with Peterson's consent. 239 The court denied

the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to Peterson's
claim for publicity given to private facts. 240 It was a genuine issue of fact
whether the email attachments the defendant had sent to just a few of
plaintiffs friends and family members were "substantially certain" to become
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1312.
Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a).

234. Id.; see also Robison v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Rush Cnty., No. 93,993, 2007 WL 518829, at *7
(Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) (citing Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Kan. 1985)) (stating that
publicity means a communication to the public at large, or at least so many persons that the matter is
substantially certain to become public knowledge, and that one or two persons is not sufficient); Zhu v. St.
Francis Health Ctr., No. 94,900, 2007 WL 316805, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2007) (unpublished) (holding
that an allegation that a plaintiff's medical report was provided to an opposing party in car accident litigation
was not enough to meet the publicity element).
235. See, e.g., Harris v. Neff, No. 88-1650, 1991 WVL42294, at *6-7 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 1991)
(dismissing a claim against a former employer for disclosing a plaintiff employee's termination and decision
to undergo substance abuse treatment because the plaintiff consented and because the disclosure's content
was not highly offensive to a reasonable person).
236. See Doe v. Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1250 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff
mother's allegations did not amount to "publicity" as a matter of law because a defendant school board
member disclosed the plaintiff's accusations of sex abuse against her daughter's school only to his wife);
Fields v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that an
alleged disclosure of private facts was not so widespread as to support the "publicity" element); Ali v.
Douglas Cable Commc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1383 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying a claim because no private
facts were "publicized," i.e., disclosed to the public at large or to so many persons that the disclosures were
substantially certain to become public knowledge).
237. See generally Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 2:07-cv-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229 (D. Kan. Sept.
29, 2009).
238. Id. at *1. The plaintiff and her mother also sued the former boyfriend for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
at *6.

234
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24 1
public knowledge sufficient to meet the "publicity" element of the claim.

Cognizant of the purpose behind recognizing the tort of publicity of private
facts, the trend in sister jurisdictions, the prevalence of the Internet, and the
relative ease in which information can be published over the Internet, the Court
concludes that Kansas does not, as a matter of law, preclude a privacy claim
simply because the defendant communicated the private fact to a small group of
people. Courts must look to the context of the c4mnunication--e.g., its
medium and content-before making its determination.

The federal district court's reasoning in Peterson v. Moldofsky 24 3 suggests
some willingness to relax the widespread publicity element, at least when the
defendant uses email or other digital technology to publicize private, sexually
244
explicit images.
Defenses: As noted above, Kansas law generally recognizes consent as
a defense to any cause of action for invasion of privacy. 245 Kansas law does
not require written or even express consent; the plaintiffs consent may be
either express or implied.246
Absolute and qualified privilege defenses generally apply to claims for
publicity given to private facts to the same extent they apply to actions for
defamation. 24 7 In addition, the Kansas courts have recognized qualified
privileges for employers who report the reasons for a former employee's
discharge to union officials consistent with a contract obligation, 248 for
insurance companies that disclose medical information to a nonprofit, private
249
trade association about a prospective insured for underwriting purposes,
and for health care providers who disclose information to court officials about
250
the mental health of a parent in a child custody proceeding.
However, the Kansas Supreme Court has taken a relatively conservative
approach to the "public records privilege" recognized by several other

241.

Id. at *5.

242. Id. at *5; accordRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
243. No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009).
244. The case went to trial in November 2009, ending in a jury verdict and judgment for each of the
plaintiffs, including punitive damages. Judgment in a Civil Case, Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 2:07-cv-2603EFM (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2009), ECF No. 89.
245. "In an action for invasion of the right of privacy, it is a defense that the individual consented to the
act. Consent may be shown from (his)(her) conduct and the surrounding circumstances." PATTERN
INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.62 (4th ed. 2012).

246. Id. at 127.62 (citing Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808 (Kan. 1953)) ("Consent may be
shown from (his)(her) conduct and the surrounding circumstances."); see supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text. The facts in Peterson suggest that consent is not a complete defense. Although the
plaintiff initially consented to be photographed by her former boyfriend, she certainly could not be assumed
to have consented to the distribution of the sexually-explicit photos by email to her family and friends. See
Peterson, 2009 WL 3126229, at *3. On the other hand, her consent to the photographs did defeat her claim
for intrusion upon seclusion. See id. (finding no evidence of intrusion based on the manner in which the
information was obtained).
247. Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1075 (Kan. 1972) ("the right of privacy does not
prohibit the communication of any matter though of a private nature, when the publication is made under
circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of libel and slander").
248. Id. at 1073.
249. Senogles v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358, 1364 (Kan. 1975).
250. Wemerv. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256-57 (Kan. 1985).
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jurisdictions, 25 1 at least when the information sought is not used for a public
purpose consistent with the underlying policy of KORA. 2 52 In general, the
court has held that only "unwarranted" publication of private facts is
other defenses
actionable, allowing considerable room for courts to recognize
2 53
under the broad umbrellas of justification and privilege.
Under a Kansas statute first enacted in 1995, employers have a qualified
privilege to disclose matters pertaining to current or former employees,
including an absolute privilege to disclose certain matters in writing in
response to a written request from a prospective employer. 254 The statutory
privilege is consistent with the common law qualified privilege "with respect
to business or employment communications made in good faith and between
corresponding interest or duty in the subject matter of the
individuals with a 55
2
communication."
Like other privacy claims, publicity given to private facts is subject to
the two-year catchall statute of limitations applicable to actions involving
"injury to the rights of another, not arising on2 56contract," and not otherwise
enumerated in the Kansas statutes of limitation.
D. FalseLight Invasion ofPrivacy

The fourth variation of the right of privacy is closely aligned with
defamation, but redresses different injuries. 25 7 Under the Restatement,
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
matter and the false light in
reckless disregard as to the falsity2 5of
8 the publicized
which the other would be placed.

While defamation redresses injuries to reputation, false light claims provide a
remedy for emotional and mental suffering. 2 59 But there are other important
distinctions between the two claims, and while they share some important
elements, others are mutually exclusive.
First, a cause of action for defamation requires "false and defamatory
words communicated to a third person which result in harm to the reputation
of the person defamed.", 260 Defamatory words tend to "expose another living
251. SeeELDER, supranote 17, § 3:15 n.31.
252. Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, 109 P.3d 1226, 1238 (Kan. 2005).
253. See, e.g., Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 992-93 (Kan. 1975) (quoting Munsell

v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 Syl. 4 (Kan. 1972)) ("Only unwarranted invasions of the
right of privacy are actionable.").
254. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (2013).
255. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Kan. 1986).
256. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4); see Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977).
257. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).

259. Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1075 (Kan. 1972) (citations omitted).
260. Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 683 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted); see
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person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule" or "deprive another of the
benefits of public confidence and social acceptance." 26 1 While defamation
and false light invasion of privacy both require a false statement to another, a
false light claim does not require the false statement to be defamatory in
26 2
nature.

The two claims differ in other respects as well. Publication of a
defamatory statement to just one other person is sufficient for defamation, but
a false light claim requires more-widespread publicity. 263 Defamation
requires proof of injury to reputation or one's social standing in the
community, while false light requires only some evidence of emotional or
mental injury. 264 Proof of malice is not required to establish the essential
elements of a defamation claim, 26 5 but the elements of a false light claim
require, at minimum, "constitutional malice"--defined as "knowledge of or
[action] in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the [plaintiff] would be placed." 266 Finally, defamation
does not require proof that the false statement was objectively offensive; in
contrast, a false light claim requires proof that a defendant's statement cast a
plaintiff in a false light that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."

26 7

The Kansas Supreme Court first acknowledged the possibility of a claim
for false light invasion of privacy in 1972 in Munsell, but held that the trial
268
court should have instructed the jury on the defense of qualified privilege.
PATrERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.51 (4th ed. 2012). Note that malice (constitutional or
otherwise) is not an element of defamation unless the defendant asserts qualified privilege in defense. See id.
261. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.51 (italics omitted); see Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co.,
649 P.2d 1239,1242-43 (Kan. 1982) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 737,
739, 761 (4th ed. 1971)) (defining "defamatory statement"). A similar definition appeared in the recently
repealed Kansas criminal defamation statute, which defined defamation as:

communicating to a person orally, in writing, or by any other means, information, knowing the
information to be false and with actual malice, tending to expose another living person to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule; tending to deprive such person of the benefits of public confidence
and social acceptance; or tending to degrade and vilify the memory of one who is dead and to
scandalize or provoke surviving relatives and friends.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(a) (2007) (repealed 2011).
262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E; see Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1043 (D.

Kan. 1998) ("The difference between defamation and false light claims lies in the expanded publicity
requirement [for false light claims].").

264. See Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1075.
265. Lindemuth v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 864 P.2d 744, 751 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); see PATTERN
INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS-CIVIL 127.51; cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(a) (requiring proof of actual malice
for criminal defamation). Kansas has abandoned the traditional distinction between defamation per se and

defamation per quod. Traditionally, damages were conclusively presumed for defamation per se, which
included statements charging a crime or otherwise unequivocally impugning a plaintiffs integrity. See
Bennett v. Seimiller, 267 P.2d 926, 929 (Kan. 1954) ("From such words malice is implied and damages are
conclusively presumed to result."). For defamation per quod, neither malice nor damages were presumed,
and a plaintiff was required to plead and prove both to recover. See Zoeller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 834
P.2d 391, 393 (Kan. 1992) (citing Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co., 649 P.2d 1239 (Kan. 1982)).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E; see PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.53

cmt (distinguishing "New York Times v. Sullivan malice" from "common-law malice").
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
268. Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Kan. 1972).
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The plaintiff in that case combined a claim for libel and slander with a claim
for invasion of privacy, and following a jury trial and single verdict, the trial
court entered judgment in his favor.2 6 9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that defendant employer's communication to others that plaintiff had
confessed to falsifying his time and trip reports as the basis for his termination
was subject to qualified privilege. The employer had made the statement in
good faith to union officials without actual malice and with grounds for
believing that the communication was true, even though the communication
had alleged the commission of a criminal offense. 2 70 Therefore, the trial court
committed reversible
error by failing to instruct the jury on the qualified
27 1
privilege defense.
Five years later, the Kansas Supreme Court squarely acknowledged the
existence of a false light claim in Rinsley v. Frydman,2 72 holding that the trial
court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for "publicity placing
person in false light" as defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 73 Dr.
Rinsley, a nationally-recognized psychiatrist, sued a university professor for
making statements in published accreditation reports concerning Topeka State
Hospital, where Rinsley was employed as a program director. The Supreme
allegations
Court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that Rinsley's
274
privacy.
of
invasion
light
false
for
claim
a
stated
sufficiently
While a false light claim is distinct from a defamation claim because the
two require different elements and redress different cognizable injuries, the
Kansas courts have applied many of the same principles and defenses to both
claims. 275 For example, true statements and matters of opinion cannot
support a defamation claim because neither can be proved false. 2 76 The same
rule applies to false light privacy claims. 2 77 Similarly, qualified and absolute
27 8
privileges recognized in defamation law also apply to false light claims.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas law,
269. Id. at 1072.
270. Id. at 1073 (citing Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 340 P.2d 396 (Kan. 1959), for its discussion
of absolute and qualified privilege). The court's reference to alleging a criminal offense acknowledged the
traditional distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod. A communication falsely
alleging commission of a criminal offense would have supported a claim for defamation per se, thus
presuming damages without the need for proof. See supra note 265.
271. Id. By statute, employers now have a qualified privilege to disclose matters pertaining to current or
former employees, including an absolute privilege to disclose certain matters in writing in response to a
written request from a prospective employer. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (2013).
272. 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977).
273. Id. at 339 (quoting with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (Tentative Draft No.

13 (1967))).
274. Id.
275. See Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1999); Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1075; see also
Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 854 (D. Kan. 1977); cf Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015,
1018 (D. Kan. 1986) ("[E]stablishing conditions of liability for invasion of the right of privacy requires
harmonizing individual rights with community and social interest[s].").
276. See Dominguez, 974 P.2d at 121 (citing Castleberry v. Boeing Co., 880 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (D.
Kan. 1995)).

277. Id.
278. See id.
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2 79
addressed a false light invasion of privacy claim in Rinsley v. Brandt.
Rinsley, a psychiatrist employed by Topeka State Hospital, sued a book
author and publisher for portraying him in a false light. Analogizing the false
light claim to defamation, the district court granted summary judgment for the
author and publisher, holding that the challenged statements were either
280
Even
truthful or statements of opinion, thus providing a complete defense.
if some of the published statements were false, the district court held in the
alternative that the plaintiff, as a state-employed psychiatrist, was a public
prevail without showing that the defendants had acted
figure who could not
28 1
malice.
with actual
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the first rationale, holding that a false
statement of fact is a common element for both defamation and false light
invasion of privacy. 282 Thus, to support a false light claim, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant made a false statement of fact. 2 83 But the falsity need not
be a private one: "[t]he key to a false light privacy claim is the falsehood, not
any element of secrecy. ' 2 84 As with defamation, a statement of mere opinion
will not support either claim. 28 5 Whether a statement asserts a fact or an
whether a statement of fact is true or false
opinion is a question of law, 2 86 but
287
is a question of fact for the jury.

The alleged falsity of defendant's statement must be considered in
context. 2 88 Once again borrowing from defamation law, the Tenth Circuit
279. 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Rinsley, 446 F. Supp. at 859 (denying a pretrial motion to
dismiss a plaintiffs false light claim). The plaintiff in this case was the same psychiatrist who filed the
complaint in Rinsley v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977). See supra notes 272-274 and accompanying
text.
280. Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1305; see supra note 277 and accompanying text.
281. Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1305. The Tenth Circuit did not reach this alternative holding on appeal. Id.at
1310. For a discussion of malice as defined by Kansas privacy law, see infra notes 331-334 and
accompanying text.
282. Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1307 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a (1977)). "[T]he
courts have consistently treated false light privacy in essentially the same way that they have treated
defamation. The Kansas Supreme Court has expressly noted the applicability of defamation principles to the
field of privacy." Rinsley, 446 F. Supp. at 854 (internal citations omitted).
283. See Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986) (reasoning that a
broadcast showing bail bondsmen with their clients in open court was not a false portrayal); see also Rawlins
v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975) (holding that a truthful account of charges of a
public official's misconduct cannot support a false light claim).
284. Rinsley, 446 F. Supp. at 854. Therefore, a public figure or public official does not waive a false
light claim by virtue of reaching some degree of public prominence. Id.
285. Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1307 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
286. Id. at 1309.
287. Id. at 1307 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617 (discussing defamation)). Although
one of the defendants' statements in Rinsley was technically false, the court held that any deviation from the
at 1308; see Hein v. Lacy, 616 P.2d 277, 284 (Kan. 1980) (imposing
truth was too minor to be actionable. Id.
no liability if published statements are substantially true). "Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial
provided the defamatory charge is true in substance." Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 581A cmt. f).
288. A court should examine all surrounding circumstances in determining whether a statement is one of
opinion or fact. See Tomson v. Stephan, 699 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D. Kan. 1988) (citing Janklow v.
Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1986)). Factors to be considered include "1) the precision or
specificity of the statement in question, 2) the verifiability of the statement, 3) the literary context in which
the statement is made, and 4) the public context in which the statement is made." Id.at 862-63 (citing
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239

held that "a court should not consider words or elements in isolation, but
should view them in the context of the whole [publication] to determine if
they constitute an invasion of privacy." 289 Nevertheless, "[t]he proscription
against reading statements out of context does not relieve a plaintiff from
identifying particular statements or passages that are false and invade his
privacy.'29° Thus, the plaintiff still has the burden at the pleading stage to
identify specific statements made by the defendant that are false.
As required for a claim for giving publicity to private facts, 29 1 the
alleged false statement must be given widespread publicity. 292 While
defamation and false light both have in common the false statement element,
the "publicity" required to support a false light claim is distinct from the
"publication" required for defamation 2 93:
[P]ublication is a word of art, which includes any communication .. to a third
person. "Publicity," on the other hand, means... communicating [a matter] to
the public at large, or to so many persons that [it] 29must
be regarded as
4
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.

For example, communicating a matter to no more than six or seven
2 95
individuals is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a false light claim.
By their nature, published written statements and mass media broadcasts
are more likely to meet the widespread publicity element 96 :
[Alny publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in
a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the
Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302)).
289. Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1310 (citations omitted).
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text. The publicity element is common to privacy
claims for publicity given to private facts and publicity portraying a plaintiff in a false
light. Ali v. Douglas
Cable Comnc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1383 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 652D, 652E); see Fields v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (D. Kan.
1997) (holding that communication totwo persons is not sufficient for "widespread disclosure as required by
sections 652D and 652E").
292. Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1383 ("widespread disclosure of private matters... constitute[s] publicizing").
293. Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1043 (D. Kan. 1998). "To support a claim for defamation,
communication of the allegedly false information to a single third person is sufficient publication." Id.
(citing Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1383).
294. Le v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (D. Kan. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Ali,
929 F. Supp. at 1383), aff'd 180 Fed. App'x. 34 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d
112, 121 (Kan. 1999) (quoting with approval Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1383). In Le, the plaintiffs alleged that a
defendant's employees falsely accused them of theft on three separate occasions, during which no more than
four or five other customers were present. Le, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. The court held that this evidence was
insufficient to qualify as widespread publicity and therefore could not support a false light claim. Id.
295. Id.; Green v. City of Wichita, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1279 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that "only a
handful" of persons who might have received the allegedly false information was insufficient to support a
false light invasion of privacy claim); Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (holding that communications in an
unemployment compensation hearing to a plaintiff, his counsel, the hearing officer, and his employer's
management officials were not "widely publicized," nor were communications to three prospective
employers sufficient publicity); see also Hunter v. Buckle, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1180 (D. Kan. 2007)
(concluding that handcuffing plaintiffs and escorting them one-hundred yards outside of a retail store in view
of more than twenty observers, without more, was not widespread publicity); Watson v. City of Kan. City,
185 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1209-10 (D.Kan. 2001) (holding that complaint adequately alleged that the
defendants' uniformed officers publicized false accusations to a crowd of bystanders and passersby while
seeking to execute a search warrant allegedly obtained with a false affidavit).
296. Cf Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009).
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radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give
publicity [within the meaning of the term].297

The Restatement recognizes the risk of widespread publicity when a false
statement is broadcast via mass media or publicized in print. 298 As one
example, a federal district court, applying Kansas law, held that publication of
false statements in the annual report of a publicly traded company was
sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that the allegations were
299

"publicized.,

The Kansas Supreme Court directly addressed the publicity requirement
for a false light claim in the employment context in Dominguez v.
Davidson.30 0 Dominguez sued his former supervisor and others on several
grounds after he was terminated for playing baseball while on medical leave
for a work-related back injury. 30 1 Among other claims, he alleged false light
The court affirmed summary judgment for the
invasion of privacy.
defendants, in part because "plaintiff did not present any evidence to show
such widespread disclosure of private matters as to constitute publicizing.
knowledge in the
[T]he alleged offensive statements had not become common
2

30
business community or in any other public arena."
In addition to the other elements, the false representation concerning the
plaintiff must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 30 3 The Restatement
defines a statement as highly offensive if it makes a " 'major
misrepresentation' of a plaintiffs 'character, history, activities or beliefs' so
that 'serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable
man in his position.' ,,304 Whether a false statement is highly offensive to a
is so onereasonable person is a question for the jury, unless the evidence
30 5

sided that the court may decide the issue as a matter of law.

297. Le, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (quoting Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1383); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 652D cmt. A (1977) (defining "publicity" for purposes of a claim for publicity given to private
facts). Note that the publicity element is common to both giving publicity to private facts and false light
929 F. Supp. at 1383 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D, 652E);
invasion of privacy. Ali,

see Fields v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that a
communication to two persons is not sufficient for "widespread disclosure as required by sections 652D and
652E").
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.

929 F.
299. Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1263 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing Ali,
Supp. at 1382).
300. 974 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1999).
301. Id.
at 115.
302. Id. at 121. As an alternative ground, though the plaintiff conceded that the qualified privilege
defense applied, he failed to prove that the defendants acted with malice. Id
303. Dow v. Terramara, Inc., No. 90-1412-PFK, 1992 WL 403093, at *8 (D. Kan. Dec. 4, 1992)
(granting partial summary judgment for a counterclaimant's failure to allege the "necessary element [of a
false light claim] that the statements were highly offensive to a reasonable person").
304. Carson, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c

(1977)) (alleging false statements about a plaintiff in a defendant's annual report). "On the other hand,...
'minor errors, such as a wrong address for his home, or a mistake in the date when he entered his
employment or similar unimportant details of his career, would not in the absence of special circumstances
give any serious offense to a reasonable man.' " Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt.

c).
305. See id.
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Kansas law is not entirely clear whether "malice" in some degree is
always a necessary element of a false light claim, 30 6 or only when the court
determines that the defendant is entitled to assert qualified privilege in
defense.30 7 The confusion results from the distinction between "actual
malice," as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 08 to accommodate
First Amendment concerns, and "common law malice," as defined in Kansas
defamation law.309 Under New York Times, a false statement of fact is made
with "actual malice" when the evidence demonstrates that it was made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not." 3
According to the Restatement definition of false light publicity,
"actual malice" is a necessary element of any false light claim.3 11 Yet no
Kansas case has ever held that "common law malice" is an essential element
of a false light invasion of privacy claim. 3 12 Moreover, the Kansas courts
have repeatedly cited and quoted the Restatement definitions as the basis for
common law invasion of privacy claims in Kansas. 3 13 The latest revision of
306. See Pfannenstiel v. Osborne Publ'g Co., 939 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (D. Kan. 1996) ("The Kansas
courts have not expressly considered whether actual malice is always an element in a false light claim."); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
The Institute takes no position on whether there are any circumstances under which recovery can
be obtained under this Section if the actor did not know of or act with reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the matter publicized and the false light in which the other would be placed but was
negligent in regard to these matters.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
In Tomson v. Stephan, the federal district court observed that one element of the claim under section
652E is that "the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or reckless disregard for whether the
statement was true." Tomson v. Stephan, 699 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D. Kan. 1988). Note that the "actual
malice" element as defined in the Restatement differs substantially from the Kansas definition of common
law "malice" drawn from the law of defamation: "actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure."
Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Kan. 1972); see infra notes 373-374 and accompanying
text.
307. Whether a communication is privileged is a question of law. See Castleberry v. Boeing Co., 880 F.
Supp. 1435, 1443 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Kan. 1986)).
308. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Actual malice," also known as "constitutional malice," is so named to
distinguish it from "presumed malice." At common law, a plaintiff who sued for defamation per se was not
required to prove actual malice because the derogatory nature of the false statement itself was deemed to be
presumptively malicious. See supra notes 265-266 and accompanying text. Further, damages were
conclusively presumed to result from statements that were per se defamatory. Only plaintiffs who sued for
defamation per quod were required to prove "actual malice" and damages. See Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co.,
649 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Kan. 1982). But in 1982, following Gertz, the Kansas Supreme Court abolished these
distinctions and held that reputational damages are no longer presumed in any defamation claim; a plaintiff
must prove injury to reputation in order to recover damages. Gobin, 649 P.2d at 1243 ("[un this state,
damage to one's reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation. Unless injury to
reputation is shown, plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by either libel or slander, under
our law."). Now that the traditional distinctions have been abolished in Kansas, the term "actual malice" is
easily confused with other definitions of malice adopted for entirely different reasons than the First
Amendment considerations in New York Times. See infra notes 368-373 and accompanying text.
309. The common law definition of malice in Kansas defamation law is "actual evil-mindedness or
specific intent to injure." Munsell, 494 P.2d at 1073.
310. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
311. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E & cmt. d.

312. However, proof of both actual malice and common law malice is required to overcome a qualified
privilege defense to false light invasion of privacy. See infra notes 373-375 and accompanying text.
313. E.g., Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250 (Kan. 1985). The court in Weiner considered an argument
that a privacy claim may exist outside the scope of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652. See id.at
1257. In that case, the plaintiff argued that breach of physician-patient privilege would support a claim. Id.
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the PatternInstructions in Kansas also refers to the Restatement provisions in
enumerating each of the four variations of invasion of privacy. 3 14 Therefore,
it appears settled in Kansas that "actual malice" as defined by New York
Times is a necessary element of a false light claim.
At least for communications with respect to public figures such as law
enforcement officers, claims for false light invasion of privacy are subject to a
qualified privilege defense. 3 15 Whether a plaintiff is a public or private figure
is a question of law for the court. 3 16 Because the qualified privilege defense
applies, a public figure 3 17 who seeks recovery for false light publicity must
prove that the defendant acted with common law malice, defined in Kansas as
"actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure." 3 18 Whether malice
is
presumed is a question of law, but whether malice is established by the
evidence is generally a jury question. 3 19 However, if extrinsic evidence of
actual malice is lacking, and if the content of the communication and the
circumstances of its publication are just as consistent with a negative finding
of malice as with its existence, the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict. 320 Thus, the burden of proof is on the public figure plaintiff to show
common law malice by at least a preponderance of the evidence to overcome
a defendant's qualified privilege.
A more difficult question is whether actual malice is a required element
even when the plaintiff is not a public figure but the communication pertains
32 1
to a matter of public concern. In Pfannenstiel v. Osborne Publishing Co.,
the plaintiff sued a newspaper for false light invasion of privacy after it
erroneously reported that plaintiff had been arrested for stealing a vehicle and
other property from his employer. 322 In fact, the local chief of police had
advised the defendant's reporter that plaintiffs vehicle had been stolen, and
that the accused perpetrator had been arrested outside of the state with the
stolen property. 323 Observing that Kansas courts had not addressed whether

Although the court did not rule out the possibility, it held that the facts in Werner did not merit "the adoption
of a cause of action for invasion of privacy separate and distinct from those contained in § 652 of the
Restatement." Id.
314. See PArERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL § 127.61 (4th ed. 2012).

315. Busey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, No. 93,358, 2005 WL 1805418, at *5 (Kan. App. July 29, 2005)
(unpublished) (citing Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975)).
316. Tomson v. Stephan, 699 F. Supp. 860, 867 (D. Kan. 1988) (citations omitted).
317. Like other issues pertaining to false light claims, determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as a
public figure is not clearcut. As observed in Tomson, "[d]efining pubfic figures is much like trying to nail a
jellyfish to the wall." Id. (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga.
1976)).
318. Busey, 2005 WL 1805418, at *5 (quoting Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Kan.
1986) (internal quotation omitted)). The federal district court, applying Kansas law, appropriately rejected
the "converse proposition that a candidate for public office and/or a public official may disparage a private
individual in the press without consequence." Tomson, 699 F. Supp. at 863 (emphasis added).
319. Busey, 2005 WL 1805418, at *6 (citing Turner, P.2d at 1113).
320. Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 117 (1999).
321. 939 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1996).
322. Id. at 1499.
323. Id.
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actual malice is always a required element of a false light claim, the federal
district court concluded that, at least when the false communication deals with
a matter 4 of public concern, even a private individual must prove actual
malice.

32

Kansas law does not require the plaintiff to specifically plead mental
suffering or emotional distress to support a claim for false light publicity.
General damages are thus presumed.32 5

Defenses: Both truth and privilege are defenses to claims for
defamation and false light invasion of privacy. 326 A defendant is entitled to a
qualified privilege, at least with respect to false light claims filed by public
figures and perhaps those involving communications about matters of public
concern. 327 It is unclear whether the newsworthiness privilege is always a
defense to a false light claim. 32 8 Arguably, "newsworthiness" applies to both
public figures and matters of public concern.
When a qualified privilege applies, 329 Kansas law significantly raises the
burden for plaintiffs alleging false light invasion of privacy by requiring proof
of not only "actual malice" as defined in the Restatement3 30 and New York
Times, but also common law malice. 33 1 To overcome a qualified privilege

defense, it is not enough in Kansas for a plaintiff claiming false light invasion
of privacy to prove that the defendant knowingly made the false statement, or

or
that the defendant made the statement with reckless disregard as to its truth 332
falsity, consistent with the definition of "actual malice" in New York Times

324. Id. at 1503. In part, the court anticipated that Kansas would join the majority of states that had
considered the issue reserved in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652E by requiring a plaintiff to
prove actual malice when alleging a false statement of fact pertaining to a matter of public concern. Id. at
1504. But it is unclear whether Pfannenstiel was applying the Restatement definition referring to actual
malice, or whether it was invoking a qualified privilege defense on behalf of the newspaper. Curiously, the
court did not hold that the defendant was entitled to a "newsworthiness privilege," although the subjecttheft of an automobile-was surely a matter of public concern. See supra notes 87, 199-201 (describing
newsworthiness privilege as a defense to the appropriation of name or likeness and publicity given to private
facts).
325. Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1263-64 (D. Kan. 2000).
326. Castleberry v. Boeing Co., 880 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Rinsley v. Brandt, 700
F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973)). More accurately, truth
is not a defense but rather negates the false statement element of the claim.
327. See supra notes 315-324 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
329. The notion of "qualified privilege" in defamation actions recognizes that the circumstances
surrounding some kinds of publications are sufficient to negate a presumption of malice as a matter of law,
thus shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff to affirmatively plead and prove the defendant acted with
malice in addition to the falsity of the publication itself. Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 340 P.2d 396,
399 (Kan. 1959) (citing Richardson v. Gunby, 127 P. 533 (Kan. 1912); Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, No. 32,
26 Kan. 384 (1881)).
330. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. d (1977) (defining the "actual malice"
requirement for the purposes of overcoming a qualified privilege defense to a false light publicity claim as
"clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the statement or acted in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity").
331. Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 117 (Kan. 1999).
332. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (citing with approval Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. d.
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and echoed in the Restatement. Nor is it enough to show actual malice. 333
The plaintiff must also prove "common law malice," defined in Kansas
334
defamation law as "actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure."
Under a Kansas statute first enacted in 1995, employers now have a
qualified privilege as a matter of statute to disclose matters pertaining to
current or former employees, including an absolute privilege to disclose
certain matters in writing in response to a written request from a prospective
employer. 335 The statutory privilege for oral disclosures 336 is consistent with
the common law qualified privilege "with respect to business or employment
communications made in good faith and between individuals with a
337
corresponding interest or duty in the subject matter of the communication."
But the statutory privilege entirely insulates an employer from liability for
disclosing information in writing about a former employee in response to a
338
written request from a prospective employer.
The "dual standard" required to overcome a qualified immunity defense
to a false light invasion of privacy claim requires the plaintiff to prove
common law malice by a preponderance of the evidence. In most instances,
when a defendant acts with evil-mindedness or unjustified intent to do harm
by publicizing a false statement concerning a plaintiff, the defendant at the
very least will have acted knowingly or with reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the statement. 339 In theory, however, a defendant could act with
evil-mindedness or unjustified intent to do harm (common law malice) by
portraying another to the public in a negative light, but without knowing or
believing that the portrayal is false or acting with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity (constitutional malice). 340 In any event, a plaintiff must
333. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652E cmt. d; see supra note 331.

334. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Kan. 1986) (quoting with approval Munsell v.
Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1074 (Kan. 1972)), see also Dominguez, 974 P.2d at 117; PATTERN
INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS-CIVIL § 127.53 (4th ed. 2012) ("The effect of Turner is to require proof of what is
usually called common-law malice as well as New York Times v. Sullivan malice [to overcome qualified
privilege].").
335. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b), (c) (2013); see supranote 271.
336. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(a).
337. See, e.g., Turner, 722 P.2d at 1112-13. In some instances courts have treated this point as negating
the publicity element, but the policy considerations are more consistent with invoking qualified privilege as a
matter of law. To illustrate, federal courts have held that disclosing information to large groups of persons
who have a legitimate responsibility and "need to know" the information is not sufficient to meet the
"publicity" requirement. Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1383 (D. Kan. 1996); see also
Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1043 (D. Kan. 1998). InAli, two former employees sued their former
employer, challenging the monitoring, recording, and disclosure of telephone conversations the plaintiffs had
while at work. Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1371, 1383. In other cases, federal courts have reasoned that
communicating information about the reasons for terminating an employee to another with a legitimate
interest in the information, if made in good faith in a manner that does not exceed the scope of the third
party's interest, is entitled to qualified privilege. E.g., Castleberry v. Boeing Co., 880 F. Supp. 1435, 1444
(D. Kan. 1995).
338. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (b), (c).
339. But cf Turner, 722 P.2d at 1118 (Herd, J., dissenting) ("I think publication of a false defamation
statement knowing it to be false or publication of such statement with reckless disregard for the truth is actual
evil-mindedness and evidence of a specific intent to injure the victim.").
340. "Actual malice refers to a constitutional standard that is something other than malice in its usual
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establish both common law malice and constitutional malice to overcome a
qualified immunity defense. As the United States Supreme Court has made
malice") cannot be inferred from evidence
clear, constitutional malice ("actual
34 1
of common law malice alone.
Although a false light publicity claim is similar in nature to a defamation
claim, the federal courts, applying Kansas law, have rejected the argument
that the one-year statute of limitations for slander and libel claims 342 should
also apply to false light claims. 34 3 Kansas recognizes false light invasion of
privacy as a separate and distinct tort from defamation, and no specific statute
of limitations has been enacted for invasion of privacy claims. Therefore,
unless the Kansas appellate courts hold otherwise, 3 44 the two-year catchall
to the same extent it applies to
limitation period applies to false light claims
34 5
privacy.
of
invasion
of
forms
three
other
the
V. AVAILABLE REMEDIES

Whether to litigate a claim for invasion of privacy ultimately depends on
the remedies available to the aggrieved plaintiff. Under the Restatement, both
compensatory and punitive damages may be recovered, as well as equitable
remedies. 346 Because plaintiffs have prevailed in so few published Kansas
state court cases, it is difficult to predict whether a successful plaintiff would
recover a substantial award of damages in Kansas. But one recent case
litigated in federal district court, involving particularly egregious facts,
damages for
resulted in a jury verdict awarding both actual and punitive
347
plaintiff.
the
concerning
facts
private
giving publicity to
A. Damages

The focus of a common law privacy action is to secure compensation for
sense of ill will. It is a term of art meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity."
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS--CIVIL § 127.50 (4th ed. 2012).

341. See Harte-Hanks Commc'n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 n.7 (1989) (noting the
confusion caused by the phrase "actual malice" because it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will).
342. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(a).
343. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977). Although the holding in Rinsley
regarding the applicable statute of limitations has not been cited with approval by any Kansas appellate court,
several federal courts have followed its reasoning. See Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.
1987) (hearing a federal claim alleging the interception of telephone call in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(2012)); Jones v. H.C.A. Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-1412-JTM, 1998 WL 159505, at *17 (D.
Kan. Mar. 9, 1998); Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., No. 87-1290-C, 1992 WL 190722, at *4 (D. Kan. July 28,
1992); Hoover v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., No. 88-2073, 1989 WL 84511, at *3 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. e, IM}2-3 (1977).

344. See Sports Unlimited, Inc. v. Lankford Enters., Inc., 275 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying
a one-year statute of limitations to a claim alleging tortious interference with prospective business relations
based on facts that would support defamation, absent evidence that the Kansas Supreme Court would hold
otherwise).
345. Id.
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 652H.

347. Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009); see
supra notes 237-243 and accompanying text.
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"direct wrongs of a personal character" 34 8 that result in injured feelings or
mental suffering. 34 9 In order to recover compensatory damages for invasion
of privacy, the plaintiff must produce some evidence of mental anguish,
350
emotional harm, or anxiety as a result of the defendant's conduct.
However, the plaintiff is not required to show general damages in specific
amounts and need not prove special damages before the claim is submitted to

the jury. 35 1 It is not necessary for expert witnesses to testify concerning the
plaintiffs mental suffering, nor is it necessary to introduce evidence to show
the pecuniary value of the plaintiff's mental distress. 3 52 The amount of
damages to be awarded the plaintiff for mental distress as a result of the
353
invasion is a question for the jury.
As the Kansas Supreme Court has noted, the elements of damages that
may be awarded for invasion of privacy are set forth in the Restatement as
follows:
One who has established a cause of action for unreasonable invasion of his
privacy is entitled to recover damages for (a) The harm to his interest in privacy
resulting from the invasion; (b) His mental distress proved to have been suffered
if it is of a kind which normally results from gsuh an invasion; and (c) Special
damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.

The first Kansas Supreme Court case to acknowledge a common law
right of privacy, Kunz,355 addressed whether the plaintiff was required to
allege and prove special damages. 3 56 The defendant demurred to the
plaintiffs evidence, arguing that she failed to prove any actual damages, and
the trial court agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence
established an invasion of privacy when the defendant dry goods store used
her image in an advertising film without her consent, and Stella Kunz had
produced sufficient evidence to warrant submitting her claim to the jury
without proof of special damages. 357 Thus, once the essential elements of the
348. Monroe v. Darr,559 P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977).
349. Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1075 (Kan. 1972).
350. In the absence of proof of general damages, a plaintiff who prevails in establishing the elements of
invasion of privacy may recover only nominal damages. Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 437
(10th Cir. 1969).
351. Monroe, 559 P.2d at 327 (citing with approval the "correct statement of the Kansas law" in
Manville).

352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (Tentative draft No. 21) (1975)).

355. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918). See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
356. The definition of "special damages" is somewhat elusive in the Kansas privacy cases and is no
longer part of common legal parlance. More familiar synonyms include pecuniary or economic damages,
which can be quantified and specifically proved with evidence. See Kerns ex rel. Kerns v. G.A.C., Inc., 875
P.2d 949, 959 (Kan. 1994) (citing Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 542 Syl. 6 (Kan.
1990)) (distinguishing economic from noneconomic damages). "Special damages" are those "alleged to have
been sustained in the circumstances of a particular wrong," and must be specifically claimed and proved.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, "general damages" are presumed to follow from

the particular cause of action and need not be specifically alleged or proved in order to recover. Id.
at 39495.
357. Kunz, 172 P. at 532; PATrERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL § 127.63 (4th ed. 2012). But see

Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808, 814 (Kan. 1953) (holding in the alternative that a plaintiffs
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invasion of privacy claim are established, general damages are presumed
without any proof of quantifiable specific loss. 3 5 8 Special damages may be
recovered as well if demanded and proved, but a plaintiff need not do so to
359
sustain the essential elements of a claim.
In addition to general and special damages, punitive (or exemplary)
damages are available, but only if the plaintiff first establishes actual damages
and the right to recover them. 3 60 In 1987, the Kansas Legislature codified the
threshold showing a plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for an award of punitive
damages. 361 Prior to the statutory enactment, a prevailing plaintiff in a
privacy action was required to establish that the defendant had acted with

"malice" in order to support a jury award of punitive damages. 362 Just how
the meaning of "punitive damages malice" compared
with "common law
363
discern.
to
difficult
was
malice"
"actual
and
malice"
Under the statute, the general threshold for punitive damages is
considerably relaxed as compared to the Kansas common law standard: A
plaintiff may recover punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence
that a defendant acted willfully, wantonly, or fraudulently. 364 Malice, while
evidence negated any emotional injury due to the defendant's advertisement).
358. Kunz, 172 P. at 533 (citing Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911)).
359. Id. (citing Munden, 134 S.W. 1076).
360. Lindquist v. Ayerst Labs., Inc., 607 P.2d 1339, 1347 (Kan. 1980) ("A verdict of actual damages is
essential to a recovery of punitive damages."); see also Dold v. Sherow, 552 P.2d 945, 949-50 (Kan. 1976)
("[F]ailure to recover actual damages precludes the recovery of punitive damages.") (citations omitted);
Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 9 (Kan. 1975) (citing Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 399 P.2d 822
(Kan. 1965)); Shore v. Shore, 205 P. 1027, 1028 (Kan. 1922). It is not clear how this rule applies when
general damages for emotional injury are presumed, as in invasion of privacy actions. In 1978, for example,
the Eighth Circuit applying Kansas law held that a trial court did not commit plain error by instructing the
jury that it could award punitive damages without also awarding actual damages, on the theory that for
defamation per se, actual damages were presumed. Mid-America Food Serv., Inc. v. ARA Servs., Inc., 578
F.2d 691, 696-97 (8th Cir. 1978). By analogy, the same principle would apply to an invasion of privacy
claim to the extent that actual or general damages are presumed.
361. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (2013).
362. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 859 (D. Kan. 1977) (citing Monroe in rejecting a defendant's
argument that punitive damages should not be recoverable for false light invasion of privacy); see also
Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 326 (Kan. 1977) ("A plaintiff seeking to recover punitive damages has the
burden of proving malice on the part of the defendant."). But see Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (Kan.
1973) (stating that "[malice may become material on the issue of damages," but it is not an element of an
intrusion upon seclusion claim).
363. See Mid-America Food, 578 F.2d at 701 (applying Kansas law) (equating "punitive damage
malice" with the less stringent New York Times fault standard).
Our review of Kansas law convinces us, however, that there is no functional distinction between
'knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard' and the traditional common law punitive damages
standard employed in Kansas .... '[Plunitive damage malice' under Kansas law contemplates the
same reckless or intentional acts reflected in the New York Times standard for 'First Amendment
malice' and its progeny.
Id. at 700-01. It is dubious whether this passage accurately recited Kansas common law. The commentary
to section 127.53 of the PatternInstructions in Kansas suggests that "actual malice" and common law malice
are distinguishable. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 127.53 (4th ed. 2012). The term is not

defined in statute, and Kansas cases are not always consistent in defiming the term.
364. The terms of section 60-3701(c) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated are essentially incorporated in
the PatternInstructions in Kansas. "In any civil action where claims for exemplary or punitive damages are
included, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence in the initial phase
of the trial, that the defendant acted toward the plaintiff with willful conduct, wanton conduct, fraud or
malice." Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (2013), with PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-Civil
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sufficient, is no longer a prerequisite. 365 The jury resolves the threshold issue
of whether punitive damages are warranted. If so, the court holds a separate
proceeding to determine the amount of punitive damages to award.3 66
Each of the alternative standards, "willful conduct, wanton conduct,
fraud or malice" has been separately defined in the Pattern Instructions in
Kansas.3 67 "Malice" is specifically defined as "the intent to do harm without
any reasonable justification or excuse." 36 8 It is unclear whether this general
definition of malice is intended to supersede the Kansas common law
definition of malice traditionally required to recover punitive damages. Also
unclear is whether a plaintiff must still prove malice, as defined by the
common law of defamation, to overcome a qualified privilege defense to a
false light claim. 36 9 Finally, it is unclear whether Kansas courts will continue
to apply the traditional malice requirement ("evil-mindedness or intent to do
harm") before awarding punitive damages in privacy claims, once the jury has
determined that the minimum statutory threshold is met.
37 0
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,
cautioned that "actual malice," constitutionally required to overcome a
qualified immunity defense to certain defamation claims by public officials, is
distinct from the "common-law standard" generally required by state tort law
to recover punitive damages. 3 7 1 The Court signaled that a plaintiff may meet
the "actual malice" standard for constitutional purposes without necessarily
meeting the more demanding state common law definition of "malice"

171.44.
365. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c). The statutory threshold for punitive damages is consistent with
the standard imposed by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmts. b & d
(1977) (requiring an evil or bad motive or a reckless or wanton indifference to others' rights).
366. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a), (b). The constitutionality of this bifurcated proceeding was upheld
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Smith v. Printup,866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993).
367. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAS-CIVIL 103.03, 103.04,103.05, 127.40 (4th ed. 2012).
368. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS INKANSAs-CIvLL 103.05; see also Sweaney v. United Loan & Fin. Co.,
468 P.2d 124, 131 (1970) ("intentional doing of a wrongful act with [full] knowledge of its character,and
without just cause or excuse") (emphasis added). In Werdann v. Mel Hambelton Ford,Inc., the Kansas Court
of Appeals addressed the standard of "malice" for punitive damages, defining the term as "a state of mind
characterized by intent to do a harmful act without a reasonable justification or excuse." Werdann v. Mel
Hambelton Ford, Inc., 79 P.3d 1081, 1090 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (9th
ed. 1999)). The Pattern Instructions in Kansas's definition of malice appears to have been drawn from
Werdann, although the wording of each differs from the dictionary definition: "[t]he intent, without
justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (9th ed. 1999) (emphasis
added).
369. In Kansas, it appears that the "dual standard" of malice applies. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN
KANSAS-CIVIL 127.53 cmt. But note that the Pattern Instructions in Kansas defines "malice" in a manner
entirely different from the common law definition drawn from defamation law. See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS
INKANSAS-CIvL 103.05 ("Malice is the intent to do harm without any reasonable justification or excuse.").
370. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
371. See id. at 251-52 (reinstating a jury award of compensatory damages on the grounds that the
plaintiffs met the New York Times standard to submit a false light claim to the jury, although the trial court
properly withdrew the punitive damages claim for failure to meet the state law standard of malice for punitive
damages). "In a false-light case, common-law malice-frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill
will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights-would focus on the
defendant's attitude toward the plaintiffs privacy, not toward the truth or falsity of the material published."
Id at 252.
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required to recover punitive damages. 372 Cantrell foreshadowed the current
state of the law in Kansas, at least for false light invasion of privacy claimants
seeking punitive damages. Under Kansas law, when qualified privilege
defenses apply to other privacy claims, only "actual malice" in the
constitutional sense is required to overcome the defense. But to overcome a
qualified privilege defense to a false light publicity claim, because of its close
relationship to defamation, a plaintiff must prove both actual malice and
common law malice. 373 The rationale is that false light invasion of privacy is
so closely related to defamation that the same privileges and defenses apply to
both.
In Kansas, "common law malice" was traditionally defined as "actual
evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure." 374 It remains an open question
whether the common law meaning of malice, or the more recent definition
included in the Pattern Instructions in Kansas, applies to punitive damages

claims. The comments to the current version of the Pattern Instructions in
Kansas suggest that the common law malice standard for purposes of false
light publicity is distinct from the actual malice standard as defined by the
United States Supreme Court. However, it is unclear whether "punitive
damages malice" is sufficient to meet either the "common law malice"
standard or the constitutional "actual malice" standard.
The law is clear that to support a false light claim over a qualified
immunity defense, the plaintiff must establish not only common law malice,
which requires "evil-mindedness or specific intent to do harm," but also
constitutional or "actual malice." Taken together, it appears that satisfying
this "dual standard ' 37 5 of malice to overcome the qualified immunity defense
would also meet the statutory threshold for recovering court-awarded punitive
damages. However, Kansas courts have not addressed the issue.
B. EquitableRemedies

In the late nineteenth century, when invasion of privacy was still
unknown at common law, a number of state courts awarded equitable relief to
plaintiffs who alleged facts that would later support a claim in law. 37 6 Kansas
cases addressing invasion of privacy claims have not considered the
availability of injunctive or other equitable relief. As a general rule, if an
adequate remedy is available at law, an aggrieved party is expected to pursue
372. Id.
373. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 171.44 cmt.
374. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (quoting Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d
1063, 1074 (Kan. 1972)).
375. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS IN KANSAS-CIVIL 171.44 cmt. In Dominguez, the Kansas Supreme Court

affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant employer for a plaintiff's failure to overcome the defense
of qualified immunity. The court found "no evidence of evil motive or a specific intent to injure plaintiff on
the part of defendants." Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 119 (Kan. 1999).

376. See supra note 28 (citing cases).
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that remedy. Beginning in 1918, Kansas courts have repeatedly recognized a
legal remedy for invasion of privacy. On the other hand, they have limited
the common law right of privacy in many ways by recognizing a number of
qualified privileges favoring employers, creditors, publishers, and other
defendants, as well as a variety of rather sweeping affirmative defenses.
Therefore, a plaintiff seeking a common law remedy for invasion of privacy
might be well-advised to assert a claim for equitable relief in the alternative.
Other jurisdictions have awarded plaintiffs injunctive relief, particularly
for appropriation of name or likeness for commercial use. 377 Several states
specifically provide for injunctive relief by statute. 378 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts generally provides for injunctive relief under certain
circumstances, in addition to damages. 37 9 With respect to privacy actions in
particular, the Restatement also suggests that a plaintiff may have a right to
restitution for the value of any benefits that a defendant unlawfully obtained
380
by virtue of the invasion of privacy.
In seeking injunctive relief for privacy claims other than intrusion on
seclusion, one important consideration is whether a prohibitory injunction
might trigger concerns about the defendant's First Amendment rights. For
example, if a public figure were to ask a court to issue an injunction barring
publication of embarrassing photos, the defendant might contend that the
requested injunction would amount to a prior restraint. 38 1 While the Kansas
courts have not addressed the issue, they have been generous in recognizing
newsworthiness defenses asserted by publishers.
For that reason, a
prospective plaintiff seeking equitable remedies should consider the
likelihood that the courts would entertain a prior restraint argument grounded
in either the First Amendment, the Kansas Bill of Rights, or both.
VI. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS

Unlike many other states, 382 Kansas has never enacted a statute
generally authorizing a private cause of action for invasion of privacy.
Ironically, the Kansas Criminal Code prohibits "breach of privacy," broadly
defined to include conduct that would support a common law claim for

377. See ELDER, supra note 17, § 6:15. See generally Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914
(N.D. Ohio 2004).
378. ELDER, supra note 17,

§ 6:15; see also, e.g., IND.

CODE § 32-36-1-12(2) (2013).

379. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 951 cmt. a (1977). "[T]he court is not put into the dilemma
of choosing between injunction alone and damages alone, but can properly grant an injunction supplemented
by damages." Id.
380. Id. § 652H cmt. e (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 136 (1937)).

381. Cf, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 827 (Ala. 1994) (reversing an injunction barring the
distribution of a defendant's book discussing a well-publicized murder as an invasion of the privacy rights of
the children of the victim and murderer). See generally ELDER, supra note 17, § 2:11 (discussing injunctive
relief as aprior restraint).
382. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1708.8, 3344, 3344.1 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20201 to 20-210 (2012); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009).
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intrusion on seclusion or giving publicity to private facts. 38 3 Also prohibited
are the equivalent of criminal defamation, 384 as well as the related offense of
circulating false statements disparaging the financial status of any individual
or business. 385 The Legislature has recently strengthened civil and criminal
laws to protect consumers against computer data security breaches.3 86 But the
Legislature generally has not authorized private claims for invasion of
privacy, except under very narrow circumstances involving violations of
specific criminal procedure statutes. 387 Whether or not violations of other
criminal or civil statutes might persuade Kansas courts to recognize new or
expanded civil rights of privacy is highly debatable.
Two provisions in the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure specifically
authorize civil causes of action for violations relating to personal privacy
interests. A third may support an implied cause of action for invasion of
privacy, although the issue is debatable based on limited published authority.
First, the Code of Criminal Procedure pointedly authorizes claims
against law enforcement officials for violating statutory restrictions on
conducting strip searches and body cavity searches. 388 The statute allows
recovery of actual and punitive damages, a civil penalty of up to 2,000 dollars
per violation, and even an award of costs in the court's discretion.3 89 While
common law claims for invasion of privacy are subject to the two-year statute
of limitations for tort actions not otherwise enumerated,3 9 ° the Kansas
Supreme Court has specifically held that a statutory privacy claim under
section 22-2523 is subject39to
the three-year limitations period that applies to
1
action.
of
causes
statutory
Second, a provision in the Kansas Wiretap Act, specifically section 222518, expressly authorizes a civil claim for damages by any person whose
wire, oral, or electronic communications are intercepted, disclosed, or used in
violation of the statute. 392 The statute authorizes recovery of the higher of
actual or liquidated damages, as well as punitive damages, attorney fees, and
litigation costs. However, the statute provides a complete defense for good
faith reliance on a court order authorizing the interception of any

383.
384.
385.
386.

See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (2013).
Id. § 21-6103(a)(1).
Id. § 21-6103(a)(2).
See generally id. §§ 50-7a01 to -7a04; 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 149.

387. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2518, 22-2523; see also infra notes 388-398 and accompanying text.

388. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2523 (imposing civil liability for violations of sections 22-2521(a)-(b)
and 22-2522); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 104 P.3d 991, 994 (2005) ("K.S.A. 22-2523, which
incorporates K.S.A. 22-2521 and K.S.A. 22-2522, is substantive and provides a cause of action when a search
is conducted in violation of these statutes.").
389. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2523.

390. E.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp.
850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977)).
391. McCormick, 104 P.3d at 997.
392. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2518(1).
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393
communication within the scope of the statute.
Third, the Criminal History Record Information Act limits disclosure of
criminal history record information except in strict compliance with rules and
regulations adopted by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation. 394 In particular,
the statutes preclude a criminal justice agency from requesting criminal
history information absent a "legitimate need for the information." 395 An
individual who violates the statute's prohibitions commits a Class A
nonperson misdemeanor, and upon conviction a public employee is subject to
termination for good cause. 396 The same statute expressly provides that those
remedies are "[i]n addition to any other remedy or penalty authorized by
law.", 397 While the statute does not expressly authorize a private cause of
action by a person aggrieved by its violation, some authority suggests that an
alleged violation may support a state law privacy claim, presumably for
39 8
giving publicity to private facts.
Turning to the substantive criminal law, the Kansas Criminal Code
comprehensively prohibits conduct that implicates various privacy interests.
In particular, the 2006 Legislature responded to political concerns about data
breaches and the resulting potential for identity theft by enacting new
legislation and strengthening several existing laws. 399 The legislation was
part of a nationwide effort, beginning with California in 2003, to enact laws
requiring businesses to notify consumers when security breaches occur
involving personal identifying information, to enable them to take proactive
steps to avoid identity fraud. 40 0 Modeled after the California statutes, 40 1 the
Kansas statutes generally require individuals, businesses, and government
agencies that own, license, or maintain computerized data that includes
personal information to promptly notify affected individuals of any security
breach.40 2 Unlike some states,40 3 the Kansas statute does not expressly

393. Id. § 22-2518(2); see also Fields v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1308, 1313
(D. Kan. 1997).
394. KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§

22-4701(e), 22-4704, 22-4707; see also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 10-12-1 to -

12-3 (2014).
395. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4707(a).
396. Id. § 22-4707(c).
397. Id.
398. In Patrick v. City of Overland Park, the federal district court retained supplemental jurisdiction
over a state law invasion of privacy claim based on an alleged violation of this statute. Patrick v. City of
Overland Park, 937 F. Supp. 1491, 1501-03 (D. Kan. 1996). In Patrick,a candidate for public office alleged
that the defendant's chief of police, for improper political purposes, received and later disclosed private
information from criminal history records concerning a sexual relationship between the plaintiff's former
stepdaughter and a church minister. Id. at 1494-95. The author's research has not unearthed the ultimate
disposition of the state law claim.
399. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to -7a04. See generally 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 149.
400. JOHN P. HUTCHINS ET AL., U.S. DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW: STATE BY STATE xi (2007).
401. See id at 96-99. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.80-1798.84 (2009), with KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 50-7a01 to -7a04.

402. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a0 2. "Security breach" is defined as "unauthorized access and acquisition
of unencrypted or unredacted computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality or integrity of
personal information maintained by an individual or a commercial entity and that causes, or such individual
or entity reasonably believes has caused or will cause, identity theft to any consumer." Id. § 50-7a01(h).
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authorize a private cause of action for damages against one who violates the
statute. 40 4 But other states, including Kansas, authorize the state attorney
general to file an action in law40or
equity to redress violations "and for other
5
relief that may be appropriate.'
Prior to its recodification in 2010, the Kansas Criminal Code defined and
prohibited criminal eavesdropping 4 6 and criminal breach of privacy, 4 07 both
Class A nonperson misdemeanors. 40 8 In addition, the Code prohibited
"computer crime," defined to include unauthorized access to information or
electronically-stored data on a computer system or network.4 09
When
recodified in 2010, the former statutes were merged and reenacted as section
21-6101, which now comprehensively prohibits "breach of privacy." 4 10 The
403. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West Supp. 2013) (stating that an injured customer may bring a
civil action and recover damages).
404. On the other hand, the statute expressly provides that its remedies are not exclusive and "do not
relieve an individual or a commercial entity subject to this section from compliance with all other applicable
provisions of law." KAN. STAT. A,,N. § 50-7a02(g). This savings clause would allow the courts to recognize
a common law duty based on a violation of the statute's proscriptions.
405. Id. In Kansas, the Insurance Commissioner is exclusively authorized to enforce the statute with
respect to licensed insurance companies. Id. § 50-7a02(h).
406. Id. § 21-4001. The statute prohibited, among other things, the unconsented interception or
divulging of private communications. Id. In 1983, in the absence of a "peeping Tom" statute, the Kansas
Supreme Court liberally interpreted the eavesdropping statute to include photographing a person in a "private
place" with a hidden camera. State v. Martin, 658 P.2d 1024, 1024 Syl. 2 (Kan. 1983), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Berreth, 273 P.3d 752 (Kan. 2012). Some years later, the statute was amended to prohibit
visual "eavesdropping" as well as surreptitious listening. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(a).
407. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002. The former "breach of privacy" statute prohibited, among other
things, unconsented intercepting or divulging of private communications. Id. The Kansas Court of Appeals
recently reversed a conviction under the former statute, holding that accessing e-mail messages months after
they were composed and sent to an addressee did not qualify as "intercepting" communications contrary to
section 21-4002(a). State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1192 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
408. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001(d), 21-4002(c).
409. Id. § 21-3755; see Brooks, 265 P.3d at 1191-92 (discussing the potential applicability of section
21-3755 to unauthorized copying of stored email messages).
410. Under the current version of the statute, a defendant commits breach of privacy by knowingly and
unlawfully:
(1) Intercepting, without the consent of the sender or receiver, a message by telephone, telegraph,
letter or other means of private communication;
(2) divulging, without the consent of the sender or receiver, the existence or contents of such
message if such person knows that the message was illegally intercepted, or if such person illegally
learned of the message in the course of employment with an agency in transmitting it;
(3) entering with intent to listen surreptitiously to private conversations in a private place or to
observe the personal conduct of any other person or persons entitled to privacy therein;
(4) installing or using outside or inside a private place any device for hearing, recording,
amplifying or broadcasting sounds originating in such place, which sounds would not ordinarily be
audible or comprehensible without the use of such device, without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy therein;
(5) installing or using any device or equipment for the interception of any telephone, telegraph or
other wire or wireless communication without the consent of the person in possession or control of
the facilities for such communication;
(6) installing or using a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera or photographic camera of
any type, to secretly videotape, film, photograph or record by electronic or other means, another,
identifiable person under or through the clothing being wom by that other person or another,
identifiable person who is nude or in a state of undress, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or
the undergarments wom by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that other
person, with the intent to invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in which the
other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy; or
(7) disseminating or permitting the dissemination of any videotape, photograph, film or image
obtained in violation of subsection (a)(6).
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2011 Legislature further amended the merged statute to expand its scope and
to enhance certain violations from misdemeanors to person felonies. 4 11 Both
sets of amendments took effect on July 1, 2011. The specific conduct
enumerated in the broad statutory definition of criminal "breach of privacy"
could certainly support common law claims for invasion of privacy, either for
intrusion on seclusion or for publicity given to private facts. But the new
criminal statutes do not expressly authorize private causes of action.
Kansas law also prohibits identity theft and identity fraud, each defined
in section 21-6107.412 Criminal false communication, similar to what was
formerly known as criminal defamation, includes communicating information
to another knowing the information to be false that tends to harm a victim's
reputation. 4 13 The same statute also prohibits "recklessly making, circulating
or causing to be circulated any false report, statement or rumor with intent to
injure the financial standing or reputation of any bank, financial or business
'4 14
institution or the financial standing of any individual in [Kansas].
However, none of these statutes authorizes a private cause of action by a
victim of the crime.
Given the increasing attention the Kansas Legislature has devoted to
strengthening criminal statutes related to individual privacy concerns, the
expanded scope of these statutes arguably may support a private cause of
action against a violator for resulting damages sustained by a victim. Indeed,
the Kansas Criminal Code expressly preserves "any civil right or remedy,
authorized by law to be enforced in a civil action, based on conduct which this
code makes punishable. The civil injury caused by criminal conduct is not
merged in the crime." 4 15 Yet in the absence of express legislative authority,
Kansas courts have generally declined to recognize a private cause of action
for violation of a criminal statute, at least without some indication that the
Legislature intended to do so when it enacted the statute. 4 16 Scholars have
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101.

411. See 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § I.
412. "Identity theft is obtaining, possessing, transferring, using, selling or purchasing any personal
identifying information, or document containing the same, belonging to or issued to another person, with the
intent to defraud that person, or any one else, in order to receive any benefit." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 216107(a). "Identity fraud is: (1) Using or supplying information the person knows to be false in order to
obtain a document containing any personal identifying information; or (2) altering, amending, counterfeiting,
making, manufacturing or otherwise replicating any document containing personal identifying information
with the intent to deceive." Id. § 21-6107(b).
413. Id. § 21-6103(a)(1).
414. Id. § 21-6103(a)(2).
415. Id. § 21-5105; see id. § 21-3103 (repealed 2011).

416. Pullen v. West, 92 P.3d 584, 597 (Kan. 2004) ("Kansas appellate courts generally will not infer a
private cause of action where a statute provides criminal penalties but does not mention civil liability.")
(citations omitted); see, e.g., Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), affd in partand rev'd in
parton othergrounds, 308 P.3d I (Kan. 2013). The Kansas Court of Appeals has noted that:
Kansas courts generally use a two-part test to determine whether the legislature's intention was to
create a private right of action in a statute. First, the party must show that the statute was intended
to protect a specific group of people instead of to protect the general public. Second, the court
must review the legislative history of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended to
create a private right of action.
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observed that Kansas is unique among the states in its conservative approach
to authorizing civil causes of action based on violations of criminal
4 17
statutes.
The Tenth Circuit considered the issue in a privacy context a few years
ago in Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers.4 18 Sitting en banc, the evenly
divided court upheld a three-judge panel's split decision holding that a Kansas
prisoner could have sued a private prison facility under Kansas law for
invading his privacy by monitoring phone calls to his attorney without
consent. 4 19 The Tenth Circuit panel opinion cited the former criminal breach
of privacy statute in support of its reasoning that the prisoner had a state law
civil remedy for invasion of privacy. 4 20 However, no Kansas appellate court
decision to date has endorsed the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, nor has the
author's research located any Kansas case holding that a violation of a
4 21
criminal privacy statute would support a civil claim for damages.
Scholars have correctly noted that in Kansas, "clear expressions of
legislative intent in favor of a civil action based on a violation of a criminal
statute or administrative regulation are rare, [although] courts occasionally
attempt to find such an intent where none likely exists." 422 Whether Kansas
courts will recognize a "private attorney general" cause of action based on a
violation of a criminal privacy statute remains an open question. In any event,
the breadth and scope of the Kansas criminal statutes, as recently recodified
and expanded, offer private citizens a legal alternative to the expense of filing
a civil claim against the perpetrator. At least for conduct that falls within a
criminal prohibition, a victim can report the offense to the county or district
Shirley, 241 P.3d at 150 (citing Estate of Pemberton v. John's Sports Ctr., Inc., 135 P.3d 174, 180 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2006)). "[T]he statute must... display.., an intent to create not only a private right, but also a private
remedy." Goodman v. Kan. Dep't of Transp., 113 P.3d 822, 823 Syl. 5 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Droge v. Rempel, 180 P.3d 1094, 1097 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to infer a civil cause of action by a
pro se inmate against a complaining witness after a county attomey and an attorney general declined to
prosecute the witness for perjury).
417. See William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part 1, 49 U.

KAN. L. REv. 1037, 1053 (2001) ("In Kansas, the doctrine of negligence per se appears to differ from the
negligence per se doctrine recognized in every other state."). At the urging of The Honorable Tom Malone, a
respected Kansas Court of Appeals judge, the Kansas Supreme Court may be reconsidering its position on
implied civil causes of action. See Shirley, 241 P.3d at 157-61 (Malone, J., concurring).
418. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005), affd en banc by an equally dividedcourt, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir.
2006).
419. Id. at 1107 (citing section 21-4002(a)(1), the former criminal statute prohibiting "breach of
privacy"). However, the prisoner may well have sought redress under Kansas common law for invasion of
privacy for intrusion upon seclusion. See supra notes 108-154 and accompanying text.
420. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1107-08.
421. The exceptions, of course, are sections 22-2518 and 22-2523, the only Kansas statutes that
expressly authorize private causes of action for violating criminal statutes. In Ellibee v. Biggs, the court
rejected a prisoner's claims against his prosecutor for statements that a plaintiff claimed were false. See
Ellibee v. Biggs, No. 104,368, 2011 WL 1878153 (Kan. Ct. App. May 6, 2011). Among other arguments, the
prisoner sought to recover for negligence per se based on the defendant's alleged violation of section 214004, the former criminal defamation statute. Id. at *4. Relying on Shirley, the court held that the criminal
statute did not create civil liability; even if it did, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the defendant had
violated the statute. Ellibee, 2011 WL 1878153, at *4-5; see supra note 417 (noting that the Kansas
Supreme Court granted review in Shirley on September 21, 2011).
422. Westerbeke & McAllister, supra note 417, at 1055 (citations omitted).

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 53

attorney, or to the Kansas Attorney General.
If the Legislature, as a matter of public policy, wishes to deter criminal
breaches of privacy without imposing undue burden on the public coffers, a
more pragmatic approach would be to expressly authorize a private cause of
action against those who violate criminal breach of privacy statutes. 42 3 That
is exactly what the Legislature did when it enacted sections 22-2518 and 222523, the lone criminal statutes in Kansas that expressly authorize a private
cause of action as a means of enforcement.
VII. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Like defamation, the right of privacy is a "fascinating subject," 424 and
42 5
"the temptation quite naturally exists to write a treatise on the subject.'
Before concluding, this Part briefly identifies a number of privacy law issues
that neither the Legislature nor the Kansas courts have fully resolved.
A. The Right of Publicity
In many states, the courts and legislatures have explicitly acknowledged
considerable evolution in the common law right of privacy for appropriating
one's name or likeness for the defendant's benefit. In the early years, only
private individuals could pursue a common law action to redress emotional
injury for invasion of privacy. Most courts considered public officials and
public figures to have waived any right to privacy, or at least to have
implicitly consented to invasions of privacy when they elected to join the
public arena. 4 26 Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, however, many state
courts began to acknowledge the property interests of celebrities in protecting
the economic value of their public personas. 427 The traditional common law
right to recover damages for invasion of "privacy" by misappropriation of
one's identity thus evolved to what is now better known as the right of
"publicity." 42 8
Several scholars have erroneously cited Johnson as the basis for
concluding that Kansas courts recognize the common law right of
publicity. 429 But that conclusion reads both the facts and holding of Johnson
423. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57

VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2130 (2004) ("Legislatures create private attorneys general by statute, but before they
did and when they have not, courts have created them by judicial decision.").
424. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1986).
425. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Seimiller, 267 P.2d 926, 928 (Kan. 1954)).
426. E.g., Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 992-93 (Kan. 1975) (police officer).
427. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying
Michigan law); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting
Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York law).
428. See generally Richard Ausness, Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane",55 TEMP. L. Q.

977 (1982) (describing the evolution of the right of publicity).
429. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemptionand the Right of Publicity,36 U.C. DAVIS L.

REv. 199, 202-03 n.9 (2002).
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far too broadly. The plaintiff there was neither a celebrity nor a public figure;
he was a former Boeing employee-a private person. He did not seek
compensation for the economic value of his photograph as used in Boeing's
national magazine advertisements; he sought damages for emotional injury.
Like Kunz, Johnson was simply a classic case alleging invasion of privacy by
misappropriation, except the court acknowledged the affirmative defense of
implied consent by a private individual.4 3 °
While Kunz acknowledged in passing the possibility of a property
interest in one's image, 43 1 in none of the later Kansas cases dealing with
misappropriation have plaintiffs sought compensation for the economic value
of their identities used by defendants for commercial purposes. In other
states, publicity rights have become such a frequent matter of litigation that
several legislatures have enacted specific statutes governing the right of
publicity. 432 Some states treat the right as an expansion of the privacy right
against misappropriation of name or likeness, but in fact it redresses a
different kind of injury altogether. 4 33 Many courts cite the Restatement
(Second) of Unfair Competition4 34 as the basis for the common law right of
publicity. 435 Neither the Kansas Legislature nor the Kansas courts have
addressed the issue.
B. Descendibility
A related issue is whether the right of privacy, or any of its variations,
survives a plaintiff who dies before securing a judgment awarding damages.
436
Like
Most states recognize privacy as a right personal to the plaintiff.
43 7
heritable
are
not
and
other personal rights, they do not survive the plaintiff
438
unless a statute preserves the right to the plaintiffs estate.
The issue of descendibility has been frequently litigated over the last
decade as the early generations of mass media celebrities pass away, leaving
substantial economic value in their surviving public identities. For example,
430. See Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808, 813-14 (Kan. 1953).
431. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918) (quoting Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1076 Syl.
3 (Kan. C. Ct. App. 1911)) (referring to the exclusive right to one's picture as a property right).
432. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013).
433. Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be A Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for
Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict CommercialSpeech, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1605, 160-07 (2001) (describing the

different interests protected by the two torts).
434. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

435. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,369 (Mo. 2003).
436. ELDER, supra note 17, § 1:3. For a very recent case reaffirming the principle against survivability
of the personal right of privacy, see Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med Ctr., No. 11-1298, 2012 WL
4712205 (Ark. Oct. 4, 2012) (citing Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214 (Kan. 2004)).
437. See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895). "Whatever right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler
had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights, in the legal sense of that term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler
died, her own individual right ofprivacy, whatever it may have been, expired at the same time." Id.; see also
Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 814 (R.I. 1996) ("[T]he right of privacy dies with the
person."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977).
438. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. b.
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Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe have been the subjects of extensive
litigation and even legislation addressing the issue.439 The legal disputes
following Michael Jackson's premature death further illustrate the likelihood
that issues involving the descendibility of publicity rights will become more
440
prevalent.
The Kansas Supreme Court directly addressed the survival issue in
Nicholas, holding that a pending claim for intrusion on seclusion did not
survive the plaintiff.44 1 The court reasoned that a plaintiffs own trial
testimony is critical to keep the jury from speculating as to the personal nature
and scope of the emotional injuries sustained.44 2 In dicta, the court observed
that the only privacy claim that survives a plaintiff is misappropriation of
name or likeness. 44 3 Nevertheless, neither Nicholas nor any other Kansas case
has directly held that any of the four distinct rights of privacy survive; nor
does either Kansas survival statute444 squarely address the issue. The court's
rationale in Nicholas-that an intrusion claim does not survive a plaintiffapplies equally well to a misappropriation claim for emotional injury,
notwithstanding the court's reliance on the Restatement in suggesting that
445
only misappropriation claims survive the plaintiff.
Several states have enacted legislation to address the descendibility
issue. 446 Those states that allow the right of privacy to survive vary widely as
to the length of time the right survives the decedent. 44 7 Kansas has yet to
address the issue.
C. The PublicityElement in the Internet Age
Two variations of invasion of privacy each require widespread publicity
as an element-publicity given to private facts and false light publicity. The
Kansas courts have addressed several of these privacy claims in the context of
oral or visual communications, repeatedly interpreting the element of
"widespread publicity" to require dissemination to more than a handful of

439. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (Elvis Presley); Shaw
Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Marilyn Monroe).
440. See Robert C. O'Brien & Bela G. Lugosi, Update to the Commercial Value of Rights of Publicity:
A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words ...or Sometimes a Million Dollars,27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2 (2009);
see also Erin K. Mai, Comment, " 'Cause This is Thriller!":The True Price of Fame and an Analysis of the
Current System for Calculating Estate Taxes on the Post-Mortem Right of Publicity, 3 EST. PLAN. &
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 1 (2010).

441. Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 228-29 (Kan. 2004) (citing Estate of Benson v. Minn. Bd. of
Med. Practice, 526 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
442. Id. at 228.
443. Id.(dicta) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521).
444. Id; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1801, 60-1802 (2013).
445. Nicholas, 83 P.3d at 228-29.
446. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (2012); OKLA. STAT.

tit. 12, § 1448 (2010).
447. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (70 years), with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316(c) (2007) (30

years).
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third parties. 44 8 Unclear, however, is how the Kansas courts will interpret this
requirement in the context of email or social media communications.
Applying Kansas law, the federal district court in Kansas recently had
the foresight to identify and address the issue. In Peterson, the federal district
court considered whether the traditional interpretation of the publicity element
applies when the offending information is disseminated by email to several
third parties. 44 9 The number of email addressees in that case was no more
than a "handful," which the Kansas courts have deemed insufficient in more
traditional contexts. But the federal district court acknowledged that a single
email message sent to a few persons (together with its explicit pictorial
distributed to millions of computer users with the
attachments) can be readily
4 50
mere push of a button.
As the Kansas Legislature recently acknowledged with the enactment
and recodification of various criminal statutes implicating privacy interests,
the rapid growth of digital communication technology poses serious privacy
risks of a nature that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis could have never
contemplated. In Kansas, neither caselaw nor statutes addressing the civil
right of privacy adequately address these cutting-edge issues. They will most
certainly become more complex as telecommunications and computer
technology continue to evolve.
D. RelationalPrivacy Interests
Kansas courts have not addressed whether an invasion of a plaintiff's
right of privacy may support a cause of action by a close relative. The
majority rule disfavors relational privacy claims. 451 However, a small but
growing number of states have expressly authorized relatives to recover for
invasion of a decedent's privacy, at least under limited circumstances. 4 52 A
related issue is whether a relative may bring a derivative action for intentional

448. E.g., Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1999).
449. See Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009).
450. Id. at *5.

451. Cordell v. Detective Publ'ns, Inc., 419 F.2d 989, 990-91 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying Tennessee
law) (citing numerous cases); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 65-66 (Il1.App. Ct. 1960)
(holding that the right of privacy does not protect a mother from the harm caused by a publication concerning
the murder of her son); see also Gruschus v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying
New Mexico law) (holding that a privacy action does not survive a decedent unless the complaining party's
privacy is also invaded); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. b (1977) ("In a smaller number of

states there is statutory authorization for an action on the part of surviving relatives for invasion of privacy of
one who is already deceased, with the invasion occurring after his death.").
452. See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08(l)(c) (2013)); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 131 (Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
420 U.S. 469 (1975); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (Ky. 1912) ("A man may recover for any injury
or indignity done the body [of one's dead child], and it would be a reproach to the law if physical injuries
might be recovered for, and not those incorporeal injuries which would cause much greater suffering and
humiliation."); G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1128 & n.2 (Pa. 1998); Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333,
342 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding that immediate relatives have a protectable privacy interest in the
autopsy records of a decedent); see also ELDER, supra note 17, § 1.3.
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infliction of emotional distress (known in Kansas as the tort of outrage) based
on a violation of the right of privacy of another. Although unaddressed in
Kansas, a federal court recently confronted this issue in an unpublished
decision applying Kansas law.4 53 The court acknowledged a mother's claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her daughter's former
paramour, who had emailed sexually explicit photos 4of
the daughter to the
54
mother as well as to other family members and friends.
E. Scope and Applicability of the Newsworthiness Privilege
As Kansas courts have held, whether a privilege defense applies to an
invasion of privacy claim is a question of law. The privilege defense, if
applicable, may be absolute or qualified. If the privilege is qualified or
conditional, the effect is to require the plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice,
special damages, or perhaps both. Whether a privilege defense is absolute or
qualified is presumably also a question of law.
Kansas courts have occasionally disposed of privacy claims on the basis
of the newsworthiness privilege, but the scope and applicability of the
privilege is not clear. For example, Kansas appellate courts have at least
twice invoked "newsworthiness" as a defense, but they have not clarified its
scope. In one of those cases, the plaintiff was not a public figure, although
the subject matter of the publication-carrying concealed weapons-was
deemed a matter of public concern. 4 55 Moreover, that case involved a
misappropriation claim. Most states broadly recognize "newsworthiness" as a
defense only when the communication involves a matter of public concern,
and then only if the information in question has a proper nexus to the subject
matter. 456 Kansas law is unclear when and to what extent the newsworthiness
privilege applies. The available caselaw suggests that Kansas courts are
magnanimous in recognizing this defense
when asserted by news media, even
4 57
figure.
public
a
not
is
plaintiff
when the
F. Absolute Privilegefor Communications in Judicial,Legislative, and
AdministrativeProceedings
As a matter of public policy, a person who provides information in the
453. Peterson, 2009 WL 3126229, at *2.
454. Id.The mother eventually recovered both compensatory and punitive damages on her claim. See
supranotes 237-244 and accompanying text.
455. Haskell v. Stauffer Commc'ns, 990 P.2d 163, 165 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (complete defense); see
also Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975) (absolute defense).
456. See generally ELDER, supra note 17, §§ 2:18, 3:17, 6:9 (discussing the newsworthiness privilege).
457. Early cases appeared to rely on New York Times, Inc. v. Hill, which was later abrogated by Gertz,
by focusing not on the public interest of the matter published but rather on the public stature of the plaintiff.
But no U.S. Supreme Court cases relating to the newsworthiness defense preclude a finding in favor of a
plaintiff when actual malice is shown. Although broad, newsworthiness is generally not considered an
"absolute" or "complete" defense. But see Haskell, 990 P.2d at 165 (declaring newsworthiness as a
"complete defense"to a misappropriation claim).
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context of judicial, legislative, and quasi-judicial proceedings is absolutely
immune from civil liability. 4 58 However, Kansas cases are unclear as to when
the privilege applies, and sometimes courts apply qualified immunity defenses
when absolute judicial immunity would seem to apply.
In addition to the traditional bases for the absolute privilege, the Kansas
Supreme Court has extended prosecutorial immunity to include an
investigatory privilege. 459 While the court appears open to recognizing an
absolute judicial privilege in privacy claims, it does not apply to invasions of
privacy that do not require publicity as an element.4 60 Therefore, even though
judicial privilege is an absolute defense when applicable, it does not defeat a
claim for intrusion on seclusion, which does not require publicity or
publication as a necessary element. 46 1 The same principle would appear to
apply to claims for misappropriation of name or likeness, except that the
scope and underlying policy for the absolute privilege are highly unlikely to
apply if the plaintiff asserts a commercial use of name or likeness.
G. Scope and Applicability of QualifiedPrivilege
As with the complete defense of absolute privilege, cases do not clearly
articulate the legal principles for determining when qualified privilege applies
as a conditional defense. It is an issue of law whether a defendant's
communications are entitled to qualified privilege. When qualified privilege
does apply, its effect is to rebut either the presumption that the defendant has
acted with actual malice, or that the plaintiff has suffered damages in the form
of emotional or mental harm. To overcome the privilege, the plaintiff
generally must establish actual malice and special damages in addition to the
other elements of the claim.
With respect to a claim for publicity casting plaintiff in a false light,
Kansas law requires proof of "actual malice," the term of art descriptive of
"constitutional malice." Therefore, a prima facie case for false light invasion
requires proof of the familiar elements of "actual malice": knowledge of the
falsity of the information publicized, or reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity. But that is not enough to overcome the Kansas qualified privilege to a
false light claim. Under Kansas common law, when a defendant is entitled to
assert qualified privilege, the false light plaintiff must also prove that the
defendant acted with "common law malice" as defined in Kansas defamation
law, specifically "evil-mindedness or specific intent to do harm" to the
458. See Clear Water Truck Co. v. M. Bruenger & Co., 519 P.2d 682, 685 (Kan. 1974) (administrative
proceeding); Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (Kan. 1973) (judicial proceeding). "To facilitate the
effective performance of government, absolute privilege is granted by constitution, legislative enactment or
case law to those who serve in a legislative, executive or judicial capacity." Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722
P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1986) (citing Redmond v. Sun Publ'g Co., 716 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. 1986)).
459. Sampson v. Rumsey, 563 P.2d 506,511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
460. Froelich, 516 P.2d at 997.

461. Id.
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plaintiff.
What is unclear is the additional burden a plaintiff must meet once a
court holds that a defendant has a qualified privilege defense to one of the
other forms of privacy invasion. The reasoning in Froelich, that an absolute
immunity defense did not apply to intrusion on seclusion because publication
is not an element, suggests by analogy that qualified privilege also does not
apply when publication of the information gained is not an element of the
claim. How the qualified privilege applies, if at all, to misappropriation of
name or likeness is not clear. Further, if qualified privilege does apply, the
proof required to overcome the conditional defense is not clearly articulated in
Kansas cases.
Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court has not clarified whether a private
plaintiff must prove "actual malice" in a claim for false light publicity against
a private defendant involving a matter of public concern. In Turner v.
Halliburton Co., 463 Justice Holmes explicitly left that question for another
day, and that day has apparently not yet come. As a result, the Kansas law on
qualified privilege needs clarification.
H. The Various Meanings of "Malice"
Kansas law is in disarray regarding the meaning of the applicable
standard of "malice" for three distinct purposes: (1) "actual malice" of the sort
necessary to comply with federal constitutional considerations applicable to
both false light and defamation claims (at least by public figures); (2)
"common law malice," also required to overcome a qualified immunity
defense if applicable to a claim for defamation or false light invasion of
privacy; and (3) "punitive damages malice," required by Kansas statute as one
of four alternative prerequisite jury findings for a court to award punitive
damages. The three definitions of "malice" appear to overlap in some
respects, but not others. The cases also appear to confuse the terminology,
perhaps for understandable reasons given the confusing nomenclature
borrowed from Kansas defamation law ("common law malice"), United States
constitutional law ("actual malice"), and state statutes governing punitive
damages ("punitive damages malice").
The courts are not consistent even in defining "common law malice" for
purposes of proving defamation and false light privacy claims, often
confusing that definition with the meaning of constitutionally required "actual
malice." What is clear is that a plaintiff must prove both "actual malice" and
"common law malice," as defined by the Kansas courts, to overcome a
qualified privilege defense to defamation or false light publicity.

462. See supra notes 306-324 and accompanying text.
463. 722 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1986) (4-3 opinion).

2014]

The Right to Be Let Alone

The Pattern Instructions in Kansas define malice, apparently for the

purposes of awarding punitive damages, without citing caselaw or statutes.
Nor has the term been defined by the Kansas Legislature.
I. PrivateCauses ofAction for Violating CriminalPrivacy Statutes

At least since 1980, Kansas courts have taken a constrained approach to
464
interpreting Kansas criminal statutes to authorize private causes of action.
But in September 2011, the Kansas Supreme Court granted a petition for
discretionary review in a case that questioned the historical basis for this
approach.465 In the two years just preceding the split decision by the Kansas
Court of Appeals, the Kansas Legislature recodified and expanded the
criminal statutes prohibiting interception of communications and other
breaches of privacy.
On July 19, 2013, the Kansas Supreme Court clarified its position on the
matter in Shirley v. Glass,466 holding that a civil litigant may indeed use the
violation of a criminal statute to establish the breach of a duty of care by a
defendant who has violated the statute. 4 67 However, the statute must have
been enacted to protect public safety, and the character of the plaintiff s injury
must be of the sort the Legislature sought to prevent by enacting the
statute.468 Because the plaintiff in that case had pleaded only common law
negligence and not a statutory claim, the court declined to address "what a
party must prove in order to state a claim that is created by [a criminal]
statute." 469 However, the court appeared to leave open the possibility that a
criminal statute may support a civil claim, even if the criminal statute is silent
470
with respect to civil remedies for its violation.
It remains unclear whether Kansas courts would consider a violation of a
criminal invasion of privacy statute sufficient to establish the breach of duty
required for a negligence claim, or whether a violation of a criminal invasion
of privacy statute would support an independent claim by the victim for civil
remedies against the perpetrator.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Sixty years after one jurist referred to the law of privacy as a "haystack
in a hurricane," the state of privacy law in Kansas continues to evolve
464. Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134, 157-61 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (Malone, J., concurring), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 308 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013).

465. See Shirley, 308 P.3d at 1..
466. 308 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013).
467. Id.
at 6.
468. Id.at 6-7 (holding that the plaintiff, the mother of a murdered child, stated a negligence claim
against the child's great-grandmother for knowingly assisting her grandson, a convicted felon, in purchasing
the firearm he later used to kill the boy).
469. Id.
at 6-7.
470. Id.
at 5 (dicta).
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incrementally by judicial decision. Although Kansas courts generally refer to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a guideline for the common law right,

they have also recognized numerous exceptions, qualifications, and defenses.
Seldom have Kansas courts ruled in favor of a plaintiff in a right of privacy
case. The Legislature's recent focused attention to privacy concerns in the
Kansas Criminal Code belies the confusion and lack of predictability that still
characterize the Kansas common law right of privacy.
In a time of fiscal austerity, it may be unrealistic to expect county and
district attorneys, or for that matter state elected officials, to devote scarce
financial and personnel resources to prosecuting new and expanded criminal
offenses relating to privacy interests. The Legislature should consider
authorizing private causes of action to enforce these prohibitions, much like it
did to ensure the enforcement of statutory restrictions on strip and body cavity
searches. Or perhaps the Kansas Supreme Court should consider relaxing its
traditionally conservative approach to judicial recognition of private causes of
action for violations of Kansas criminal statutes. The comprehensive criminal
statutes the Legislature has recently enacted to prohibit various conduct
amounting to invasion of privacy will remain paper tigers in the absence of
adequate state and local resources to prosecute these crimes.
The Legislature should consider joining other states by enacting a
comprehensive statutory right of privacy. The Kansas common law right of
privacy was first recognized in 1918 to redress the emotional harm Stella
Kunz suffered when her neighbors recognized her image, photographed
without her knowledge, in an advertising filmreel displayed at the
neighborhood movie theater. Most Kansans would be proud to learn that
Kansas was a leader among states in recognizing the common law right of
privacy. Nearly a century later, the Kansas right of privacy has substantially
evolved, driven by litigants who have raised novel issues before the courts.
But common law developments in privacy law can no longer keep up with the
rapid evolution of technology.
Given the technological advances that now enable intrusions on privacy
of a nature never contemplated in 1918, Kansas has fallen generations behind
other states in acknowledging the privacy rights that most Kansans hold dear.
With respect to privacy law, Kansas still has a lot to learn.

